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STATE ACTION PROBLEMS
Christian Turner*
Abstract
The state action doctrine is a mess. Explanations for why federal
courts sometimes treat the private actions of private parties as public
actions subject to the Constitution, as the Supreme Court did in Shelley
v. Kraemer, are either vastly over-inclusive or fail to explain our law
and values. A better approach is to understand the state action doctrine
in institutional terms. I introduce a two-step, institutionally focused state
action theory that is a natural consequence of a broader public-private
theory of legal systems. In the first step, a court identifies a "state action
problem," meaning a privately made law that is poorly governed by the
ordinary rules governing the making of contracts. If a court finds a state
action problem, it proceeds to the second step and decides whether
courts have superior capacity to remedy the problem than do other
governmental institutions. This theory captures important intuitions
about the public regulation of private lawmaking that other approaches
either ignore or fail to ground theoretically. In addition, it helps to
justify why racial discrimination is often a decisive fact in finding state
action, explains why the doctrine is rarely invoked, and provides a firm,
theoretical foundation for a doctrine otherwise adrift in search of
guiding principles.
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INTRODUCTION
Was Shelley v. Kraemer correctly decided?' The Constitution plainly
prohibits states from imposing racially discriminatory laws, but does it
forbid private parties from entering discriminatory covenants? Answer
yes, and one needs to explain why a rule addressed to states should
constrain agreements between private individuals-and why it does not
apply to all private conduct. Answer no, and the task becomes justifying
inaction in the face of entrenched, private apartheid. Our dinner
invitations, marriage proposals, and even business ventures certainly
must be immune to at least some of the constitutional law that requires
public actors to afford equal treatment, due process, and respect for all
viewpoints. At the same time, widespread, private racism can lead to an
unequal, caste-like society as surely as statutes commanding it be so.
In Shelley, the Supreme Court chose the path of action, deciding that
it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for Missouri courts to
enforce racially discriminatory private covenants, no matter the
covenants' apparent compliance with state law and the inapplicability of
any federal statute. 2 The enforcement by public courts was the "state
action" that the Constitution regulated and found wanting. But if the
substance of a private agreement is constrained by the Constitution
merely because a court enforces the agreement, then there is no area of
private contract law left unregulated by the Constitution. Every private
1. 334 U.S. 1(1948).
2. Id. at 19-23.
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actor is subject to the constraints on public actors. 3 And yet, if private
actors are never subject to constitutional regulation, then powerful
coalitions of private individuals are free to use their coercive capacity to
create, for example, a de facto system of racist zoning. Shelley must be
wrong, and yet it must be right.
Take another case turning on the presence of state action: May a
corporation forcibly eject a religious speaker from streets the
corporation owns in a town the corporation owns because it wishes to
suppress such speech? Again, private citizens violate each other's free
speech rights all the time, choosing associates and houseguests on the
basis of social, political, or religious viewpoints. Only the State is
constitutionally prohibited from discriminating in this way.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in Marsh v. Alabama, decided that a
company that owns an entire town must allow speakers to exercise the
speech rights they would have in an ordinary, publicly owned town.4 Of
course, racially discriminatory covenants and company-owned towns
are not the only private spheres in which the state action question is
problematic. From privately operated political primaries to protests at
large shopping malls, some of the most puzzling cases in our
constitutional law turn on whether private entities ought to be treated as
if they were an arm of the State.
A principle that explains or refutes these decisions has proved
elusive. The line of state action opinions has been criticized as
incoherent, ungrounded, and insincere. The Supreme Court itself has
acknowledged that the "cases deciding when private action might be
deemed that of the state have not been a model of consistency."5
Vikram Amar has more candidly stated that "[i]t might be fair to call the
area a mess." 6 I would go further. It is a mess.
Why are these cases difficult? Why depart at all from using an
actor's formal status as a rule-like state action threshold? Why is a more
flexible state action doctrine, such as the one we have, desirable and yet
so hard to fashion? The answer to these questions lies in better
understanding the heart of the problem, the dichotomy that is the
bedrock of our legal system: the public-private distinction.
3. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Property Stories: Shelley v. Kraemer, in PROPERTY STORIES
169, 194 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) ("Shelley seemed simply to assert
that judicial enforcement of covenants is 'state action'; but this raises the familiar problem of
constitutionalizing every private civil conflict that appears in court.").
4. 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946).
5. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger, 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995) (quoting Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
6. Vikram David Amar, The NCAA as Regulator, Litigant, and State Actor, 52 B.C. L.
REv. 415, 416 (2011).
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The morass of the state action doctrine is almost entirely a product of
conflicting intuitions concerning what is public, or somehow of the
State, and what is private, or not of the State.
In the state action cases, the basic structure of legal systems is
exposed, and the most essential and divisive political question-the
proper division of authority between the collective and the individuals
that compose it-starkly demands an answer. If undisciplined, this
inquiry can be so uncertain that any rule that depends on identifying
what is public, or state action, and what is private action is easily
transformed into a vessel for the imposition of raw policy preferences.
In response to any argument that a thing is private, one can always
argue that it is public.
There is, however, a better way than muddling through, one that
helps elucidate the purposes the state action doctrine serves and the
policies that are important when choosing how to apply it. To find it, we
must first understand that the question is not whether a regulated entity
is public or private in the undifferentiated abstract, but whether it
exhibits the particular private or public characteristics at which the
secondary rules regulating its lawmaking power are targeted.
Any legal system, whether or not based in part on a written
constitution, maintains two bodies of law that may be characterized as
fundamental Constitutional Law.8  "Private Constitutional Law"
comprises the criteria for creating and reviewing privately enacted law,
including ordinary contracts. In our system, this includes the doctrines
of offer and acceptance and of unconscionability. Private Constitutional
Law responds to the stereotypical institutional difficulties of private
lawmaking bodies, including self-interestedness. In contrast, "public
7. By secondary rules, I mean the rules that govern the creation, change, and use of the
primary rules that govern behavior directly. As H.L.A. Hart put it:
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary
type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether
they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or
secondary to the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or
modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence or control their
operations. Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer
powers, public or private.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (2d ed. 1994). The written U.S. Constitution governs,
among other things, the creation and change of laws by the Congress. Its provisions related to
legislature composition, the enactment of laws, and right-based prohibitions on the content of
laws are all secondary rules. So too, state contract law setting forth offer and acceptance and
other doctrines as criteria for the validity of a contract are secondary rules. See also Christian
Turner, Law's Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1003, 1013-14(2012).
8. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1013-16; see also infra Part III.
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Constitutional Law" governs the creation and review of publicly
enacted law. The governance of congressional lawmaking in our own
written Constitution is a part of this law. Public Constitutional Law,
because it governs the making of law that will bind others without their
consent, is responsive to the stereotypical problems of public agents.
Viewing legal systems in this way, it becomes clear that the state
action cases raise a kind of "Categorization Problem," a problem of
choosing between alternative bodies of secondary rules to govern an
institution. A legal system encounters a type of Categorization Problem
that I call a "state action problem" when the characteristics relevant to a
formally private entity's lawmaking competency more resemble those
of public institutions. In such a case, private Constitutional Law will be
ill-suited to prevent unacceptably bad decisions. This is because private
Constitutional Law has been tuned to respond to the typical failings of
private entities, not those of public entities more similar to the actor
with respect to the decision at issue.
To put it differently, the legal constraints on contracting parties are
tuned to the problems private lawmakers typically encounter. Some acts
of private lawmaking are, however, far more like public lawmaking, for
which there are different types of constraints addressed to the
stereotypical problems that attend making laws that bind non-
consenting others. Private actors engaged in the equivalent of public
legislation therefore present a state action problem, meaning that they
are poorly governed by the usual private secondary rules.
But finding a state action problem is only the first step in applying a
sensible state action doctrine. The existence of such a problem does not
imply that the only solution is to empower a judge to impose public
Constitutional Law on the private actor. Rather, state action problems
create tension in a legal system that may be resolved in a number of
ways. Federal or state legal systems, by legislation or common law, can
supply appropriate governance of categories of state action problems by
means other than formal application of their public constitutional rules.
For example, the rules passed by homeowner associations, despite their
private source, are routinely put to a higher, more public-like standard
of review than are ordinary contractual provisions. Such review, as will
be discussed further, is a solution to a clear state action problem, but
one that does not rely on wholesale classification of the association as a
public lawmaker.
It is only when (1) the mismatch between the governing private
metalaw and private lawmaker is severe and (2) the political (and other)
branches within the legal system have failed to supply a solution and
are peculiarly disabled from doing so that courts, as a last resort,
consider declaring that the private actor is in fact a "state actor." The
state action doctrine as we know it is, therefore, a body of law intended
2013] 285
to solve a coupled institutional problem. First, is the lawmaking at issue,
though formally private, so unlike stereotypical private conduct or
lawmaking that the institutional controls of ordinary, private
Constitutional Law are a bad fit? Second, is there a reason for courts to
attempt to solve this problem themselves by imposing public, rather
than private, Constitutional Law?
This two-dimensional understanding of the state action doctrine
solves the doctrinal puzzle. It tells us, for example, why race is such a
salient factor in state action cases-why the result in Shelley is
principled and not just the exercise of judicial power to achieve a
political objective. It also tells us why Shelley would and should come
out differently were other constitutional values than racial equality at
stake. It does so by analyzing institutional competence, rather than
substance. Perhaps counterintuitively, institutional analysis better
focuses legal debate on the heart of the normative disagreements that
make these cases intuitively difficult: the line between the individual
and the collective and the power to decide where to draw the line.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly describe the state action doctrine
and its difficulties. To explain the institutional approach, I then review
the public-private theory of legal systems and define, within that
theory, the two-step state action inquiry. In Part. III, I contrast this
structural theory of state action with more traditional theories and study
their varying applications to some canonical state action cases.
The public-private distinction defines the underlying structure of
legal systems. Properly understood and focused, it defines our legal
bedrock, giving shape to legal systems while remaining mostly unseen,
buried under an apparently disordered surface. The state action doctrine
represents the ragged, rocky outcroppings of this bedrock. State action
cases are difficult to classify, unrecognizable, and hard to square with
other doctrine. They are the puzzling cases that challenge the most basic
principles of lawmaking and adjudication-principles that normally lie
safely under the surface, intuited but rarely analyzed, in most of our
legal landscape. If we want to understand these hidden principles better,
9. This is a more general theory of state action than most. All legal systems encounter
state action problems, as they all must grapple with categorizing lawmaking institutions to be
governed by public or private metalaw. The first step of the theory I advance here, the
identification of state action problems, does not depend on the legal system's having institutions
that are like legislatures or courts. Only the theory's second step is specially adapted to our own
structure, depending as it does on a legal system's welfare-orientation and division of power
between institutions that resemble courts and legislatures in the relevant respects.
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then we should, like geologists, train our attention on the outcroppings
that seem to defy all the normal rules.
I. EXISTING DOCTRINE AND APPROACHES
The state action doctrine deals with a group of cases that seem to
contradict ordinary judicial experience. A court will have before it a
private actor, but there exists some reason to think our Constitution
ought to apply to this actor as it does against public actors. Perhaps he
has suppressed speech or discriminated in a manner that is not forbidden
by statutes or other laws targeted at private individuals. Nonetheless,
and for reasons we will endeavor to understand, an unusual argument
seems plausible, an argument normally foreign to litigation among
private parties: that the written Constitution provides a reason to forbid
the private conduct at issue. The doctrinal problem has been to construct
rules and standards to guide the decision whether it does.
The Supreme Court long has labored to construct such a framework.
The catholic nature of its efforts was illustrated in Brentwood Academy
v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n.10 There, the Court
described the state action doctrine as a search for a "close nexus
between the State and the challenged action."" Stressing that the
doctrine contains no clear necessary or sufficient conditions, the Court
summarized various factors that have at times been found controlling.' 2
It is important first of all to distinguish among the cases that fall
under the state action rubric. Only some of these raise the
Categorization Problem with which this Article is concerned. For
example, the Court has stated in several cases that the key to finding
state action lies in determining "when it can be said that the State is
responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains."' 3
This test, though conceptually appealing, speaks only to cases in which
the problem is with governmental conduct, perhaps because of its
contribution to invidious private conduct. Unless stripped of meaning, it
does nothing to explain a finding of state action in the cases that
concern us here--cases like Shelley, Marsh, or Terry v. Adams,14 in
10. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
11. Id. at 295-96 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
12. Id. These factors include State participation through: (1) its "coercive power," (2) the
provision of overt or covert "significant encouragement," (3) involvement as a "joint" actor,
(4) control of the private actor as an agency, (5) delegation of a public function, or
(6) "entwine[ment]" with the private actor, either through its policies or through "management
or control." Id. at 296.
13. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
14. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 475-77 (1953) (holding that the election process
of the private Jaybird Party violated the Fifteenth Amendment, even though the process was not
20131 287
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which the state's participation was confined to upholding private
agreements or rules and, in doing so, omitting more stringent
regulations. If judicial enforcement of a private agreement is enough to
say that the court-and by extension, the state-is "responsible" for the
specific conduct, then there is no serious limitation to what may
constitute state action. Every private agreement a court attempted to
enforce would be reviewed for its constitutionality.
But "responsibility" as a criterion for state action is problematic even
if it could be given a reasonably certain meaning that draws a far more
modest line. After all, if the problem in a case is the State's
responsibility, rather than the public-like character of the private actor,
it would seem more logical to target the State itself-to seek an end to
the State's conduct that is, in fact, "responsible for the specific conduct
of which the plaintiff complains." And yet, the remedy for the State's
responsibility is typically in the form of a judgment against the private
defendant, not the State. Why is this?
Progress in this area depends at the outset on understanding that not
all state action cases are the same. There is a class of cases involving
actual conduct by government agents to aid a private party, resulting in
injuries to plaintiffs that would surely be unconstitutional if caused by
the government agents directly. Public agents are surely regulated
according to public Constitutional Law, and I would treat the claims of
plaintiffs in such cases as complaints directed at stopping the
government's own conduct.
For example, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the
constitutional claim should have been against the government for its
own hosting of a racially discriminatory tenant when it had the power
not to do so. Under the theory I will develop here, the tenant would not
be susceptible to constitutional regulation directly, as the case does not
involve a state action problem. But that does not mean that the
regulated by the State); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948) (holding that state courts'
enforcement of racist restrictive covenants constituted state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1946) (holding that a state
trespassing statute preventing distribution of religious materials on a town's sidewalk was
unconstitutional, even though the sidewalk was part of a privately-owned company town).
15. 365 U.S. 715, 716-17 (1961) (finding unconstitutional state action where a private
tenant of a state agency operated a cafe in the agency's public parking garage in a facially
racially discriminatory manner).
16. There is, I admit, some uncertainty here. But whether or not the much more difficult
claim can be made that the Court should treat the private actor as a public actor on account of
the state action doctrine, the point here is that there is an entirely separate claim that the
governmental parking authority itself acted unconstitutionally in continuing to lease out public
space that was subject to racially discriminatory operations. Mixing the question of
unconstitutional governmental conduct with the separate question of the public character of the
288 [Vol. 65
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Constitution has nothing to say about the dispute in that case. The
problem in Burton was with formal government support of
discrimination, not with a private actor that is so coercive, powerful, or
otherwise public-like that constitutional regulation of it, directly, is
appropriate.17
I classify cases involving perhaps ordinary private actors whose
conduct is questioned because of actual governmental support or control
as "find the state" cases.' 8 I do not venture here to improve the analysis
of these cases, cases I believe should turn on the constitutional propriety
of whatever it is that the government is doing in support. The question
is not so much one of whether the private party is a state actor, although
government control could lead a court to find that a putatively private
party is a state agent for constitutional purposes. Rather, the question is
whether those actions that are concededly those of the state are
unconstitutional. Let us for now, though, leave such cases behind.19
While they involve their own difficult problems of line drawing,
agency, and competing conceptions of governmental duties, they do not
raise the more fundamental issue of assessing the appropriate role and
character of the public-private distinction in classifying actors, as the
most difficult state action cases do.
This Article is concerned with state action cases in which the
complaint is only with the private party's own conduct, as to which
there is some reason to think public Constitutional Law is the
appropriate governing regime. And the question I ask is what reason
that should be. The Court's doctrine has been promiscuous in
actor leads to confusion.
17. Which of these adjectives matter, and why, is the topic of the next Part.
18. When teaching state action to students, I have sometimes referred to the theory behind
these "find the state" cases using the regrettably and increasingly outmoded term "Scooby Doo
theory." Under such a theory, a court will endeavor to pull back the mask of the private actor
and reveal the face of the State; the private actor then declaring that he or she would have gotten
away with it but for the pesky plaintiffs.
19. I include in this category cases such as Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger, 513
U.S. 374 (1995), San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. US. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522
(1987), and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In each of these, the gravamen of the
state action litigation theory was the nature of the government's involvement. See Lebron, 513
U.S. at 398-400 (finding Amtrak, as a government-created and -controlled corporation, to be a
state actor); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 543-47 (finding that the U.S. Olympic
Committee is a private actor despite receipt of government favors); Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at
839-43 (finding a private school to be a private actor despite receipt of public funds). As I have
stated, it would be better to view these cases as raising questions about the constitutionality of
the government's aid of private organizations that carry out what would be unconstitutional
activities if the government did them directly. That is a different question than whether the
private actor is so specially situated, again in ways we will seek to uncover, that constitutional
regulation as if the private actor were a governmental entity is appropriate.
2013] 289
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entertaining a number of intuitive stances for it is difficult to call them
theories, to reach results in difficult cases.10 .
The cases leading up to Justice Souter's summary in Brentwood
further illustrate that there is no set of circumstances, much less a
principle establishing such a set, that is necessary or sufficient to find
state action. The Court found state action when state courts enforced
racially discriminatory private covenants,2' when a company town
ejected a religious speaker,22 and when a private group held a statewide
primary that had no formal binding effect but was used to select
political candidates.23 It has refused to find state action when a
monopoly provider of electrical power cut service without what the
plaintiff claimed was the process due,24 when a private club used
racially discriminatory membership policies, 25 and when a private
warehouse sold an evicted apartment dweller's belongings without her
consent.26 And it has reversed itself on whether shopping malls that are
open to the public but discriminate among speakers have engaged in
state action.
In reaching these decisions, the Court has adverted to the potential
salience of a private actor's monopoly power,2s the enforcement by
public courts as a kind of public ratification,29 the public nature of the
private actor, 30 the relative weights of the rights on either side,31 a more
generalized "nexus" of some sort between the actor and the State,32 and
a number of other arguments. Sometimes these kinds of facts have been
found decisive, sometimes unavailing. But it is unclear which facts truly
matter, how much they matter, or why they matter. The problem is not
only that the set of salient facts is not defined. It is that there is no
20. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor
of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 303-04
(1995) (explaining that the Supreme Court has developed three state action tests, each difficult
to apply and of little help in solving the inconsistency of the state action doctrine).
21. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
22. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).
23. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953).
24. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
25. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972).
26. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978).
27. Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (announcing that
"the rationale of [Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968)]," in which the Court found that a shopping mall engaged in state action,
"did not survive. . . [Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)]").
28. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-60; Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350-51.
29. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1948).
30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,507-08 (1946).
31. Id. at 505-09.
32. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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doctrinal statement or even a loose theory concerning how these facts
should be evaluated and weighed against one another.
In Marsh v. Alabama, the company-town case, the Court declared
that "[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for
use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
use it." 33 This has surely been a justification for antidiscrimination
statutes applicable to places of public accommodation, 34 but as a
statement concerning the application of public Constitutional Law it is
woefully incomplete. No court has found that a business is a state actor
bound to respect "constitutional rights" merely because it has opened
itself to the public in general. This factor alone cannot explain, if it
can be explained, how it could be thought that Marsh is correct but that
its reasoning should not extend to other businesses.36
An extensive record of scholarship exists on this sort of state action
question. While each theoretical approach uncovers important truths,
each is found wanting by proving too much, standing for too little,
appearing to state a test but ultimately passing the untransformed
question to courts, or otherwise failing to grapple with what is actually
difficult in these cases. Our intuition is onto something, but the theories
do not fully follow it.
In broad, taxonomic outline, they concern ad hoc factors, a balance
of the competing rights of the plaintiff and defendant, the degree of an
actor's power in the market, or the actor's formal public or private
status. Part III will explore these in more detail and contrast their
33. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
34. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 833,
854-55 (2001) (arguing that when an accommodation is open to the public, a desire to
discriminate is economically irrational and can only be motivated by "illegitimate" private
desires the state should "destroy").
35. See, e.g., Brooks v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 791 F.2d 512, 515-19 (7th Cir. 1986)
(approving private exclusion for any reasons other than those prohibited by statute).
36. The Court's further observation that "[w]hether a corporation or a municipality owns
or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free" is on its face
unhelpful. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507. Read too coarsely, it suggests a sort of durability of
individual, constitutional rights and the need to protect them regardless of whether the threat is
governmental or private. Rights are rights, and contra Hohfeld, they are inherent rather than
relational. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913) (arguing that a "right" necessarily refers to a
correlative "duty"). But there is more than a hint of a far better and more interesting idea here.
The problem the Court identifies is not the mere blocking of an individual's speech by a private
entity, but the blocking of whole "channels," disrupting the "functioning of the community."
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507. This approach, as will be shown, is consistent with the doctrinal test
derived from the institutional theory I develop in this Article.
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application with that of the institutional theory I develop next. But a
brief description of these approaches will help to show why the move to
institutional analysis is promising.
Ad hoc tests based on arrays of factors suffer from the familiar
problems of multifactor balancing tests. Such tests may provide some
degree of guidance by at least excluding some issues from
consideration, but, ultimately, they delegate to courts the relatively
unmodified question of whether an actor is "state-like" or sufficiently
connected to the state.
Subtly different from the ad hoc approach are those theories that
advocate junking or substantially limiting the state action doctrine and
instead balancing the constitutionally relevant interests of each side of
the dispute, with perhaps ancillary reliance on other policies.37 The
trouble with this approach, aside from the extent of regulatory authority
it delegates to courts, is that it assumes that constitutional regulation
would be better but for the abrogation of individual, constitutional rights
it necessarily entails. As I will argue, this approach takes inadequate
account of the fact that Constitutional Law is tailored to the institutions
it governs. A private actor may be poorly governed by constitutional
rules, not only because such rules would abrogate the actor's own
constitutional rights, but also because private actors are not the types of
entities constitutional rules are designed to govern.
An actor's power in the market provides a seemingly better
justification for finding state action. 3 9 Under this kind of approach, state
37. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985)
(arguing that the state action doctrine should be eliminated and replaced by a balancing test in
which courts would weigh the right infringed against the justification for the infringing activity);
Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 481
(1962) (arguing for state action when the state could have proscribed the private denial of
constitutional rights if so finding is not outweighed by the actor's liberty and property rights);
William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 53 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961) (arguing
for examining the effects on the interests and on local authority of the parties of federal
intervention); see also Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional
Limits on Private Power, 10 CONsT. COMMENT. 361, 372 (1993) (setting forth a three-question
state action inquiry, centering on whether the private rights violation has similar effects as state
denial would and, if so, whether the justifications for upholding private denial are substantially
weightier than those for upholding state denial would be).
38. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
39. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-
Protection ofPersonal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933
(1952) (examining the theory that large corporations, because they are creatures of the state and
exert great economic control over the citizenry, should be subject to constitutional restraints);
Jesse H. Choper, Commentary, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function" and
"Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 757 (1979) (endorsing a finding of state
action when private parties exercise governmental power); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Changing
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action exists if a private actor wields substantial market power, perhaps
literally monopolistic. But what kind of power matters, and why? Why
should relative wealth trigger regulation by constitutional regulations
meant to govern the state? To the extent that market power is a proxy
for finding coercive capacity, the theory looks in the right place. As I
will argue, however, power alone is a descriptively and normatively
inadequate basis for finding state action.40 It is manifestly not the case
that powerful private actors are considered state actors under the
Supreme Court's doctrine. More critically, I will argue that looking only
to private power fails to grapple with both the suitability of public
Constitutional Law as a means of regulation, and the capacity of courts
to apply it or its principles wisely in such cases.
The formal-identification approach urges that the state action label
be reserved for formal, government officials 41 There is an important
intuition in this very rule-like approach, which suggests the
inappropriateness of the application of the rules of government to
private parties and which is perhaps also skeptical of courts' abilities to
apply such rules to private parties. It would not, however, be able to
sustain the results in a number of existing cases, including Shelley.
Which of these approaches should be used? What really matters? Is
it the importance of the individual rights, the power of the private actor,
or the individual rights of the private actor or his or her opponents? Is it
a balance of all of these? Or is it only the actor's formal status, the
actor's resemblance to a recognizable form of state agency, or the
resemblance of the actor's particular conduct to typical governmental
conduct? The cases do not tell us. The theorists disagree, and there does
not seem to be a good way to evaluate the competing arguments.
As I will explain, the root of the problem is that the Court and most
scholars have shoehorned what should be a two-step inquiry about the
nature of institutions (namely, the private actor and the Court itself) into
a single, purportedly substantive inquiry into the "nexus" between the
private actor and the state, even for state action cases that are not "find
the state" cases.4 2 It doesn't work. To see why, and to focus the doctrine
Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979 WASH U. L. Q.
741, 744 (1979) (arguing for state action, inter alia, where a private exercise of power is
literally monopolistic, like government action).
40. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction,
and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONsT. COMMENT. 329, 333-34 (1993)
(arguing for limiting the doctrine to sanctioned acts of government officials).
42. See Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L.
REv. 663, 682-87 (1995) (describing the nexus "theory" of state action).
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on the right questions, we must first understand the public-private
institutional structure that all legal systems share.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF STATE ACTION: AN ALTERNATIVE
APPROACH
Beneath a jumbled surface teeming with doctrines, principles, rules,
and exceptions, legal systems are built on a bedrock of simple
distinctions between what is public and what is private. Basic to
collective governance are decisions concerning what institutions should
exercise what kinds of legal authority. And the primary choice of
institution is that between a public actor on the one hand and a private
actor on the other.43
This underlying public-private structure of legal systems is usually
not apparent in practice. The focus in most legal disputes is on subject-
specific doctrine, but this specificity is often illusory. What looks like a
doctrine peculiar to an area of contract law, for example, can instead be
understood as the consequence of applying a much more general
principle to that area's particular institutional context. While there is
much to be gained from understanding these trans-substantive
principles, legal disputes are almost always resolved without
acknowledging them directly.
The state action cases lie in that area of our law where the public-
private distinction-and thus an inevitable grappling with basic
principles-comes to the surface. These cases are outcroppings of law's
public-private bedrock, exposing the normally hidden complexity of the
boundaries. By studying them, we learn more about law's underlying
structure. And more importantly, by understanding the bedrock, we can
finally make sense of these seemingly mysterious outcroppings.
In this Part, I will begin by describing law's public-private structure
and explaining how public and private lawmaking each are governed by
specially tuned bodies of Constitutional Law intended to solve the
predictable institutional problems of these very different lawmakers.
Then, I will turn to an institutional theory of state action in legal
systems. A firm understanding of the public-private structure will
render obvious the two-part inquiry at the heart of our own state action
doctrine: identification of state action problems followed by an analysis
of the need for and ability of courts to solve them.
A. The Bedrock
Legal systems are structured at their basic level by divisions of
authority between public and private decision makers. It is intuitive,
43. See generally Turner, supra note 7.
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after all, that among any collective's initial and most important projects
is to define those things it will do collectively and those it will leave to
its individual members." With respect to its legal system, the rules
under which the collective will use its coercive power can be
collectively (publicly) or individually (privately) made. Putative
violations can be publicly or privately prosecuted. This basic division of
authority defines our most fundamental legal categories.45 Privately
made and privately prosecuted law, I call Contract Law. Publicly made
and privately prosecuted law, I call Tort Law. Publicly made and
publicly prosecuted law, I call Criminal Law. And, privately made and
publicly prosecuted law, I call Parens Patriae. These categories are
summarized in the following chart:
Privately Publicly
Created Created
Privately Contract Law Tort LawProsecuted
Publicly Parens Patriae Criminal Law
Prosecuted ,_II
The power of this taxonomy of legal systems arises from its
characterization of substantive law in terms of institutional control. The
public and the private are the highest-level institutions within any
collective. Each will invariably contain numerous subdivisions
(legislatures and courts, for example, on the public side, corporations
and families, for example, on the private side), but these subinstitutions
inherit many features of, and legal rules applicable to, the parent
institutional category. By creating a substantive map of legal systems in
terms of institutional control over basic decisions, we can
(1) understand apparently substantive problems in institutional terms
and (2) translate problems and results from one substantive area of law
to another by noting and adjusting for the different institutional
environments.
But how do we decide who makes and prosecutes which kinds of
law and under what constraints? That is, how do we populate the
taxonomy's boxes? Legal systems have "metalaw" to answer these
questions about their laws. I call the metalaw governing the making of
law "Constitutional Law" and the metalaw governing the prosecution of
44. Id. at 1009 & n.15.
45. Id. at 1010-13.
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law violations "Procedure." 4 6 Thus, the basic public-private structure of
legal systems is summarized in this chart.
Constitutional Law
Privately Publicly
Created Created
Privately Contract Law Tort Law
Procedure ProsecutedPublicly Parens Patriae Criminal Law
Prosecuted I I
Legal systems therefore possess a body of private Constitutional
Law and a body of public Constitutional Law. Their differences reflect
the institutional contrasts between the lawmakers in each category.
What is usually called "contract law" (including the rules of offer and
acceptance and other criteria for contract validity, the rules governing
contract interpretation and construction, and the rules concerning the
making and enforcement of contracts) is, in fact, the "Constitutional
Law of Contracts." Contract law itself is the body of substantive, law
specified by the many individual terms arising out of the universe of
privately created contracts.
While all Constitutional Law, public and private, concerns the rules
for selecting lawmakers, determining the scope of their powers, and the
measurement of enactments for compliance with various policies-
structure and rights in the usual parlance-these rules are quite different
in Contract than in Tort and Criminal Law. The taxonomy helps us to
appreciate that these rules differ precisely because they apply in
different institutional contexts. Because private and public lawmakers
have different stereotypical strengths and weaknesses, the metalaw
governing their lawmaking decisions will differ in response to these
characteristics.
So, for example, Contract's lawmakers are determined by a few rules
(for example, age and other capacity rules) but primarily by standards
meant to establish the consent of the parties who would be bound.47 If a
proposed law has the consent of all the parties who might be obligated
under it, then that law is, as an ex ante matter, appropriately enacted by
the consenting parties. That is, we vest private parties with lawmaking
power over laws that will bind only them.
46. Id. at 1013.
47. Id. at 1035-38; see also, e.g., Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1403 (2009) ("In contract theory,
consent is indispensable. . . .").
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Contrast this with publicly made laws, where lawmakers are chosen
by rule-like procedures, normally by popular voting or appointment by
other public officials, and given the authority to make laws of certain
types regardless of the consent of the individuals who will be bound as a
result.48 Public lawmakers are empowered to make laws that will bind
others. Because of this, the rules for public lawmaker selection and
legislative scope are tuned to control the deficiencies private individuals
might normally have when making laws that will apply to others.
Even if private and public lawmakers are vested with authority, their
output might prove contrary to the public good. While they appeared
appropriately positioned to make law as an ex ante matter, reading the
law ex post it may become clear that the institution failed to perform as
designed. Contracts, though apparently voluntary, may be
unconscionable or contrary to public policy. 49 Public laws, though
validly enacted, may violate important rights (which I will, for
convenience, refer to under the umbrella term "due process"). 50
Constitutional Law meant to detect these sorts of problems with
legislative output is of a different type than that which governs
lawmaker selection ex ante. I have identified two abstract,
institutionally grounded principles from which these two branches of
Constitutional Law can be derived.
I have labeled the "first principle," or ex ante principle, the
imperative that decision makers be selected and empowered in a way
that is likely to render them institutionally competent. This means that
they are likely to act consistently with an attempt at some optimization
52
of a social welfare function. Deconstructing an arbitrary function into
the capacities needed appropriately to perform it, I have identified five
discrete, core competencies: private calculation, public calculation,
aggregation, distribution, and resource.53 These five points of
institutional comparison give us a somewhat crude but at least analytical
method of evaluation, an institutional calculus.
48. Turner, supra note 7, at 1038-42.
49. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2011) ("If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract...."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981)
(explaining when a contract is void as contrary to public policy).
50. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (noting that due process
protects "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1033-34.
52. I do not assume any particular function.
53. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1018-20.
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* Private calculation competency reflects the ability of an
institution to estimate the preferences of others with respect
to the decision at hand. An individual is often, but not always,
the best calculator of his own preferences and therefore
usually has a private calculation advantage over others with
respect to decisions that affect only him. 54
* Public calculation competency refers to the ability to assess
that portion, if any, of the collective good not reflected in
individual preferences. 55 If such public preferences exist,
private institutions are often, but not always, relatively less
competent to assess them than appropriately constituted
public entities.
* Aggregation competency is the ability of a decision-making
entity to combine these preference inputs, weighing and
ordering them according to the collective will.56
* A particular kind of aggregation competency is the ability to
weigh the preferences of another as heavily as one's own. I
call this capacity to decide unselfishly distributive
competency.5 7
* And finally, resource competency is the possession of the
means actually to effect a decision.5 8
Any two institutions, and in particular a public and a private entity,
can be compared by . their relative advantages in these core
competencies. My first principle demands that lawmakers be selected
and empowered in such a way that the resulting lawmaking body will
possess all of these competencies. 59 This institutionally posed principle
yields substantive legal rules when reduced to application in a specific
institutional context.
The first principle applied to private lawmaking leads to a rule that a
contract must have the consent of all those who would be bound by its
terms. Private individuals are stereotypically well-positioned to take
account of their own preferences.6 0 While they are sometimes able to
calculate the preferences of other individuals, it would be problematic to
54. Id. at 1019.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1020.
59. Id. at 1034-42.
60. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFrr 77 (1921) ("Every
person is the final and absolute judge of his own welfare and interests."); Turner, supra note 7,
at 1019.
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permit an individual to make law for another outside of narrow
circumstances.61 This may be due in part to a misapprehension of the
other's preferences, but it is certainly the case that individuals almost
always weigh their own preferences more heavily than those of others.
The tendency toward distributive disadvantage is so severe in individual
private lawmakers that societies generally bar them from making laws
that bind non-consenting others.62
Private groups of individuals, however, can solve this problem
through agreement. By manifesting agreement to be bound, a private
group can signal that it is, collectively, distributively competent and
well-calculating. 63 If the group believes it will be better off with a law
applicable only to itself, many societies will enforce the law, believing
that individuals know themselves best and that society is better off when
its members are better off. As an ex ante matter, before the content of its
law is examined, a consenting group of lawmakers proposing to bind
only itself has all the core competencies and satisfies the first
principle. 64
Contrast this with public lawmaking bodies, those invested with the
necessary but hazardous responsibility of making law that will bind
others involuntarily. These bodies must be chosen in a way that
maximizes their potential to take account of others' preferences (private
calculation competency) and, most critically, minimizes the risk that
lawmaking authority will be used for private gain or for the enrichment
of some groups at the expense of others contrary to the collective will
(distributive and aggregative competency). Selection mechanisms,
which often seem to be rule-like and formal, and lawmaking procedures
are tuned to ensuring good agency. Private contracting groups, by
contrast, are not bound by rules that condition their authority on being
good agents of non-members, because they, unlike public lawmaking
bodies, are rarely empowered to make laws binding non-members.
61. Such circumstances include the parent-child relationship and guardianships. See, e.g.,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); W.J. Dunn, Annotation,
Mental Condition Which Will Justify the Appointment of Guardian, Committee, or Conservator
of the Estate for an Incompetent or Spendthrift, 9 A.L.R.3D 774, § 2[a) (1961) ("[I]t now seems
to be well settled that the courts may appoint a guardian, conservator, or committee to manage
the property or estate of another, without a finding that the ward is generally or totally insane.").
62. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1022-23.
63. Id. at 1022.
64. Id. at 1035-36.
65. See id. at 1039-40 (citing and discussing Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of
Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHi. L. REv. 361 (2004)).
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The "second principle," or ex post principle examines decision-
making output for manifest institutional failure.69 Such failures occur
when a lawmaking body, despite compliance with the first principle,
nonetheless generates a law demonstrating that it lacks the core
competencies. Even though the first principle may have been satisfied, a
law's content can reveal, ex post, a lawmaker's core incompetence. In
the private context, unconscionability is, at bottom, a doctrine derived
from the second principle. It is an inquiry into whether an apparently
voluntary-and thus first-principle compliant-agreement is so unfair
that it manifests substantial private-calculation failure (ignorance) or
distributive failure (coercion). Both are ways that, ex post, a private
law's output can negate the ex ante presumption that apparent consent
reflects actual voluntarism.
Further, a private law that is otherwise voluntary but is contrary to
public policy is one that manifests a failure of public calculation or
aggregation advantage.68 In our legal culture, voluntary assent to a
private law that will bind only the contracting parties is usually assumed
to be in the public interest. 69 If those affected believe they will be better
off with the law and if no other entities are affected, then we presume
the enactment contributes to the public good. On rare occasions,
however, this is not the case. Examining the contract, the output of the
private lawmaking process, it may become apparent that the parties
lacked public calculation or aggregation advantage; even though they
were unselfish among themselves and fully took into account their
compound welfare, they failed egregiously to measure the impact on
total social welfare in the same way the public would.70 Their decision
66. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1042-45.
67. See, e.g., Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889) (describing an
unconscionable contract as one "no man in his senses, not under delusion, would make");
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable
to the other party.").
68. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1035 n.70..
69. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 702 (1939)
(reviewing 0. PRAUSNTZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)) ("Our courts are loath indeed to throw out a contract clause under
the plain justification that it is contrary to public policy . . . .").
70. See, e.g., United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[A] parent's
contract allowing a third person to burn, assault or torture his child is void."); Dwyer v. Jung,
336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), af'd per curiam, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975) (invalidating a restrictive covenant between lawyers because it harmed the
public's "unlimited choice of counsel"); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 486 P.2d 1093,
1097 (Wash. 1971) (invalidating an exculpatory clause in a landlord-tenant contract, "the
generalized use of which may have an impact upon thousands of potential tenants").
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in such a situation, therefore, does not match the reason they are,
institutionally, given lawmaking power in the first place, because they
have not enhanced overall social welfare through private empowerment.
In the public lawmaking context, the various due process rights serve
the ex post examination function that unconscionability and public
policy limits provide in private contracting.7 ' Assuring voluntarism of
all those affected is no longer the institutional strategy. Unlike private
contracting parties, public lawmakers are agents. The first principle
yields specific constitutional efforts to secure good lawmaking agents,
including rules concerning representative selection schemes and public
visibility intended to promote accountability, but these are no
guarantee.72 Like any agents, public lawmakers may miscalculate the
principal's wants or even substitute their own wants for the principal's.
For this reason, public Constitutional Law is concerned with
encouraging good agency, choosing and structuring agents in such a
way that they are more likely to take proper account of individual
welfare and to act unselfishly and policing lawmaking output for
manifest institutional failure. For example, a public law that pursued
private redistributive efforts, in contravention of the public good, would
run afoul of the second principle. 73
Because public Constitutional Law polices agent behavior rather
than consent, it often authorizes more searching review of lawmaking
output under the second principle than private Constitutional Law does.
While it is possible that apparent consent in Contract Law hides
coercion, there is probably a far greater danger that public lawmaking
agents may abuse their status to pursue nonpublic ends. And while it is
possible that contracting parties, even those creating obligations only
among themselves, may try to enact laws that conflict with public
norms or have adverse social effects beyond the parties, there is, here
too, a far greater danger that public laws binding broad swaths of
society will be inimical to social values. Our own law reflects these
concerns, subjecting publicly made law to more numerous and
comprehensive prohibitions and to greater judicial scrutiny than
privately made law. In what follows, we will explore just how much
more control courts have over the substance of public laws.
This difference in treatment under the second principle means that
much turns on the characterization of law as publicly or privately made.
71. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1043-45.
72. Id.; see also Vermeule, supra note 65, at 381-82.
73. See Turner, supra note 7, at 1039; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 493 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There may be private transfers in which the risk of
undetected impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a presumption (rebuttable
or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under the Public Use Clause.").
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I call this sort of problem, where the metalegal treatment of an
institution's output depends on the characterization of an institution, a
Categorization Problem. Such a problem, as noted above, lies at the root
of our difficulty with the state action doctrine. So let us turn now to the
Categorization Problem arising from the distinction with which the
doctrine grapples-that between public and private lawmaking.
B. The Outcropping
The public-private structure of legal systems suggests that the
private creation and private enforcement of law will be regulated
differently, owing to the private character of the lawmakers and
prosecutor, than will be the public creation and public enforcement of
law. The public and private are fundamentally different institutional
types, prone to different kinds of deviations from the public interest, and
thus their decisions are subjected to different forms of scrutiny. But how
do we tell in a given case whether the decision-making entity is public
or private?
In most legal systems, the question whether an act of lawmaking was
public or private is almost always resolved without any conscious effort.
Nearly all lawmaking is, under the system's rules, clearly public or
clearly private. This is not to say that there is uniform agreement, as a
theoretical matter, to the public or private nature of the dispute in total.
Rather, by this I mean that there is usually no argument made
concerning the appropriate body of Constitutional Law that should
apply: All parties agree to apply either public or private Constitutional
Law without even thinking to disagree. The bedrock, shaped by a set of
public-private distinctions, is stable and essentially forgotten despite the
fact that so much turns on it.74
When the bedrock outcrops, however, revealing that the public or
private nature of the lawmaker presents an unresolved Categorization
Problem, a great deal of theoretical confusion ensues. In the United
States, we do little more than muddle through such situations, and the
resulting cases are criticized as unprincipled and chaotic. These cases,
nonetheless, have established a state action doctrine that is mostly on
74. To be sure, one could design a legal system in which this stability and invisibility are
absent. Suppose that acts of public lawmaking were identified not by detailed rules identifying
public agents but by a standard that measured the "public impact" of an otherwise private act,
together with various other criteria. If met, the act would be privileged as law binding on those
having nothing to do with the act. It is not difficult to anticipate contests over the application of
this judicially-managed standard in nearly every case of private lawmaking. There are reasons
based in the first principle to think that legal systems are unlikely to depart much from clear
rules to identify public lawmaking agents. But I do not claim that the public-private distinction
is necessarily a hidden fault line in all legal systems.
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sound theoretical footing. The public-private structure theory, casting
state action cases as problems of selecting between public and private
Constitutional Law, allows us to see why this is so.
I begin this section by demonstrating how the public-private
structure theory focuses the state action analysis on the right problem,
that of the selection of secondary rules. I then develop a two-part,
institutional test that judges should use to decide whether there is state
action justifying application of public constitutional principles to private
activity. In the first part of the test, we ask whether there is a state action
problem, meaning a mismatch between the private lawmaking at issue
and the private Constitutional Law meant to govern it. In the second, we
ask whether courts are the appropriate body to supply a solution to the
mismatch.
1. The Nature of the Public-Private Inquiry
The difficulty posed by state action cases begins to resolve as soon
as one understands the problem as primarily one of selection between
different bodies of governing Constitutional Law, each designed to
govern a different institutional type. Our legal system cannot avoid
performing this selection. The question is how, not whether, it should be
done.
Some state action theories deny that there is a coherent and desirable
selection method but instead argue that courts should have ad hoc
authority in exceptional cases to govern private actors as though they
were public.7 5 Such theories often attack the coherency of the public-
private distinction, noting, for example, that every time the collective
enforces a private contract, there is public action.7 6 By denying the
existence of a truly private sphere that ought to be immune from public
Constitutional Law, this approach would give courts the power to
perform the selection on a case-by-case basis, in each instance asking
directly which body of metalaw would yield the better result. If no
dispute settled by collective coercion is ever purely private, and if any
public involvement is sufficient to give courts the power to import
public Constitutional Law principles, then, indeed, there are only state
action cases, not state action principles.
75. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 551 (proposing that courts discard the state
action doctrine and instead "balance the rights of the violator and victim" and apply the
Constitution whenever "a person's rights were unjustifiably infringed," no matter the public or
private status of the infringer).
76. Id. at 525-26; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 ("[I]n granting judicial
enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the
equal protection of the laws .... ).
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This nihilistic denial of the possibility of distinguishing public and
private leads us down the wrong path. It mistakes a tractable but
multidimensional problem for an indeterminate, single dimensional one.
It sees an undifferentiated mass of metal where the trained and careful
eye would see separate but cooperating components of an engine. The
key is this: If we are careful to avoid the trap of describing law or some
practice as public or private in general and instead focus on whether a
public or a private entity is the source of a particular decision, much of
the perceived incoherency of the distinction falls away.
For example, the substance of a private contract is created not by the
collective but according to private will. The public will choose to back
such private legislation with public coercion if certain publicly imposed
conditions, those of private Constitutional Law, are met.7 7 Thus,
concededly, law's product, the ultimate decision whether to use
collective coercive capacities (such as fines, damages, injunctions, or
imprisonment), is indeterminately public or private. It is both. But it is a
composition of separate public and private decisions. Decomposing that
product into the antecedent decisions leading to it resolves much of the
indeterminacy and permits analysis of the rules governing those
separate exercises of public and private power that combine to yield a
judgment.
For this reason, observing, as Shelley did, that the public is
"involved" in enforcing a privately made law is not an appealing ground
for applying public Constitutional Law. Advocates of finding state
action on this basis justify using public constitutional rules meant to
govern the making of one decision (what the content of a law should be)
because the public was involved in a different decision (whether and
how to coerce compliance). But private constitutional rules are tuned to
protect the public interest when private parties make law. There is no
justification to use rules meant to govern the public creation of law on
account of the public's involvement in enforcing law that is already
made.78
77. As with publicly made legislation, private legislation is often the subject of
interpretation. The fact that courts will sometimes decide between competing meanings of
privately drafted text does not alter the fact that the source of the text was a private entity, acting
according to a private will. In this sense, the criticism that courts-through interpretation-
render supposedly private legislation public recapitulates the debate over the judicial role in
interpreting public legislation.
78. Obviously, constitutional rules applicable to enforcement, which ought to be
calibrated to protect against institutional failures likely to arise from public enforcement, would
apply to the activity of enforcement. The point here is that public constitutional rules applicable
to lawmaking are not suited to govern private lawmaking, given the different institutional
characteristics of private lawmakers. So if we are to apply public constitutional rules to the act
of private lawmaking, there must be some other reason to do so than public enforcement.
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Is there, then, ever a reason to apply public Constitutional Law to
private-law creation? The answer lies in asking the right question: not
whether there is some sufficient quantum of public involvement, but
whether a particular act of private lawmaking is adequately governed by
private Constitutional Law.
Private Constitutional Law is particularized in a legal system by
rules guarding against the stereotypical problems of private lawmaking.
Public Constitutional Law is a set of specifications and constraints
designed to avert the stereotypical problems of public lawmaking. The
state action dilemma arises when we are unsure which body of
Constitutional Law to apply. The institutional state action doctrine I
propose here is a functional response to this instance of the
Categorization Problem, one that aims to pair acts of lawmaking with
the type of Constitutional Law that is most appropriate for the
lawmaking institution at issue. Deciding whether there is state action is,
at bottom, a problem of matching law with an institutionally tuned,
governing metalaw. The work of the theory lies in describing the
institutional parameters that should be used to make this selection.
Since my focus is on the application of such an institutional state
action theory in U.S. law, which divides regulatory power amongst
multiple, public institutions, we must address an additional question:
How should responsibility for solving this Categorization Problem be
allocated to different public institutions? A primary contribution of my
approach is that it makes clear that state action cases involve two very
different, but still inherently institutional questions: (1) whether the
private lawmaking actor is poorly governed by ordinary private
Constitutional Law and (2) whether courts should remedy a mismatch
or leave the problem to other public institutions.
2. The First Step: State Action Problems
A state action problem, as I define the term, arises when the
secondary rules governing an apparently private decision maker are a
poor fit because the decision maker's potential institutional defects
more closely resemble those of public entities than those of private
ones. I will not attempt to characterize all the circumstances in which
state action problems, so defined, might arise. Rather, I will focus on
what I suspect is their overwhelmingly dominant source: private rules
that have coercive effects on non-consenting others.
Private lawmaking is generally premised on the existence of an
agreement among a group of private lawmakers who will be the only
ones governed by the law they make. It is universal consent that vitiates
the ordinary distributive and calculation incompetencies of private
2013] 305
parties. 79 In societies that place great value on individual welfare, like
ours, a privately made law accords with the preferences of the collective
because it is desired by all those who will be obligated by it and places
obligations on no one else. Put differently, self-interested, private
legislation aligns with the collective good when and only when it has
the consent of all those with significant interests in it.
In contrast, public lawmaking is a collective's mechanism for
creating rules that govern its members without obtaining unanimous
consent. Self-interested lawmakers are anathema to this process, as they
may make laws disproportionately serving their own interests and with
poor understanding of the interests of others. A primary concern of the
second principle in public Constitutional Law is to scrutinize legislative
output that is likely infected with these incompetencies, despite first-
principle-based efforts to constitute legislatures to avoid such problems.
Laws burdening groups and movements with little political
representation are perfect examples of targets for second-principle
scrutiny, as electoral incentives may not adequately stand in for truly
internalizing the preferences of such groups.o
Given the divergent concerns and methods of private and public
Constitutional Law, we should expect legal systems to have a hard time
handling privately made laws that, on the one hand, comply with the
formal enactment procedures for private law (valid contracts, for
example), and yet, on the other hand, impose burdens on nonparties
without their consent. The former aspect of such laws argues for
application of private Constitutional Law, but the latter aspect justifies
resort to public Constitutional Law. This is the Categorization Problem
lurking behind the state action doctrine.
The heart of the difficulty is that Constitutional Law is specifically
adapted to the very different sources of institutional failure arising in
private and public lawmaking institutions. Applying private secondary
rules to a lawmaking institution that is more prone to the defects of
public institutions would be a mistake at the legal system's very core,
like using a recipe to make bread but with the ingredients to make a
salad. Inappropriate categorization frustrates the primary purpose of the
system's secondary rules: to help ensure an institution's decisions are
competent as measured against public norms.
79. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 76-77 (1980). Again, the claim is not that all such laws are in fact the product of
incompetent lawmakers. But laws that place special burdens on those who are poorly
represented do pose that danger, sufficiently so that more careful scrutiny of whether competent
lawmaking could produce such a law is warranted.
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It may help to restate the functional, institutional criterion in
doctrinally oriented terms. Private action that amounts to public
legislation creates a state action problem. When private individuals
make law for others, it becomes relevant whether they have acted
adequately on those others' behalf, just as it is relevant for public
legislatures. The consent among the enactors is a poor proxy for the
overall public impact of the law. If we choose to allow such lawmaking
at all (and our legal system sometimes does), the controls of public
Constitutional Law are a much better fit for ex post, second principle
review.
I say these sorts of laws raise state action "problems" because simple
application of ordinary private Constitutional Law would poorly govern
the lawmaker. It is a description of the law, in negative terms, but not in
itself an answer to what should be done. The work of this first step of
the institutional state action doctrine is both to flag instances of private
lawmaking for the second step and to signal to other public institutions
the need for importing, if possible, supplementary public Constitutional
Law rules into the secondary law governing the problematic category of
cases. After all, the private constitutional rules were not designed to
guard, as public metalaw is, against poor agency and self-interested
redistribution. The dangers of poor private calculation and distributive
disadvantage are typically averted by those first-principle rules in
private Constitutional Law requiring voluntarism among the parties.
When applied to private Constitutional Law, the second principle,
which examines legislative outputs (the contracts or other private rules
themselves), yields only the loose highly deferential constraints of
unconscionability and public policy. ' The first step of the analysis tells
us that more is needed.
Somewhat curiously, the sprawling state action literature is mostly
barren of what seems to be an intuitive and attractive formulation of
state action: that it exists when private citizens legislate for others.
While none provides a detailed, institutional justification for such a rule,
a few articles have gestured in this direction. In an excellent student
note, Dilan Esper, after finding existing theories wanting for reasons I
mostly share, indicated a possible "collective action" rationale for
finding state action.82 As Esper put it, Shelley might be justified by an
argument that "a town cannot do through collective private action what
it is disallowed to do publicly. Thus, since zoning by race is
81. As we will see in Part III, these highly deferential forms of ex post review are
nonetheless sufficiently malleable to permit courts to solve state action problems without
resorting explicitly to public constitutional doctrines.
82. Esper, supra note 42, at 677-708, 715.
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unconstitutional, a system of enforceable covenants that segregate
neighborhoods is also impermissible."8 3
This position comes closer than most to the institutional theory
advanced here. Yet, it lacks the critical second step of the analysis to
which I will turn next. Moreover, it is not much more than a brief
animation of an intuition, albeit a correct intuition that embeds further
assumptions about institutions, assumptions I have endeavored to make
more explicit. But Esper's suggestion at least focuses on the right initial
question: Are private individuals acting collectively to bind non-
consenting others? This is, again, a doctrinal statement that can be
derived as a consequence of a more fundamental commitment. That
commitment is to proper governance by secondary law when that law is
generally tailored to the stereotypical attributes of the institutions to
which it applies.
Carol Rose also has entertained the private takeover of legislative
capacity as a possible ground for state action in her analysis of
Shelley.84 "Widespreadness and inescapability-these were the aspects
of [racially restrictive covenants] that made them seem so much like a
private takeover of governmental functions; it was a takeover in which
ostensibly private 8ersons used the courts seriously to disadvantage
racial minorities." Indeed, this captures a key circumstance in which
the institutional criterion of the first step will be met. When exit is
extremely difficult and the need is great, private providers will have
substantial coercive capacity, and the rules they make tend toward
legislation.
In the next Part, I will apply both steps of the institutional theory to
actual cases, and I will compare the answers given by the theory to
those given by other approaches. But first, let us briefly consider a
couple of examples of private laws (Contract Law within the public-
private theory) that raise state action problems, often without generating
state action cases.
a. Covenants
Covenants are an odd species of contract. They are, like ordinary
contracts, a reements between parties that are binding on the parties
themselves. But they have the special characteristic that they can also
bind successors in interest of the contracting landowners, a feature
known as "running with the land.", 7 Parties to a covenant that runs with
83. Id. at 715 (citation omitted).
84. Rose, supra note 3, at 171-72.
85. Id. at 195.
86. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. § 1 (2012).
87. Id. § 19. I use the term "covenant" to refer to real covenants and equitable servitudes,
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the land are making law not only for themselves but also for future
landowners.
This arrangement presents a state action problem for the simple
reason that not all those who will be bound by the private contract are
parties to it.8 8 It is true that future landowners consent in a fashion, as
they are only bound if they take the property with notice of the
covenant.89 This voluntarism is a bit illusory, however. To change the
law under which they live, parties subject to a covenant must often
obtain the consent of all those with a right to enforce it.90 In cases in
which the original lands have been subdivided, this can present a burden
difficult to surmount.
But if running with the land were impossible, it would be difficult to
enter private arrangements relating to the use of land, as performance is
often best rendered by the occupant, not the now-departed, original
contracting party. At its core, running with the land allocates the cost of
transaction to parties wishing to free themselves of a law, while not
running with the land allocates it to parties wishing to continue the law.
As others have noted,91 permitting private parties to make laws
governing their lands that will be binding on successors poses a host of
dangers. On the one hand, binding successors is necessary to make
covenants effective, but on the other, it can impose unwanted burdens
on successors who desire to live on the land but not under its law.
Because there is some degree of consent by those who will be bound
by covenants and because it is difficult to imagine effective law
between the parties without running with the land, a case can be made
for private lawmaking beyond the contracting parties. But because the
law affects others, the secondary law governing such lawmaking should
surely be different than ordinary private Constitutional Law, which is
tuned for and assumes voluntarism.
The common law has struck upon a solution. It has incorporated into
private Constitutional Law a publicly derived principle meant to
measure lawmaker agency. Traditionally, covenants have been required
to "touch and concern the land" in order to run.92 If the substance of the
agreement does not meet this standard, no voluntary acts of the parties
agreements that, however enforced, run with the land.
88. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 3, at 195-97.
89. See 20 Am. JUR. 2D Covenants, Etc. § 255 (discussing the general requirement of
notice).
90. Id. at § 225.
91. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern,
1988 DuKE L.J. 925, 942 ("[B]ecause of the market and the players, mistakes will likely be
frequent, large, and costly for the successors to undo . . . .").
92. See, e.g., I TIFFANY REAL PROP. § 126 (2012).
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can otherwise create it. At its most useful, the doctrine requires that the
parties have entered into the agreement because of their generic status
as landowners, not as individuals. That is, a contract touches and
concerns the land when it would benefit and burden any owners of the
lands in question.9 3 This criterion is, at bottom, a test to determine
whether the private lawmakers are likely good agents for those who will
succeed them.
In terms of the core competencies, 94 while a current landowner is not
particularly likely to be a good calculator of the preferences his
successor will have generally, he may be better when it comes to
preferences concerning the use of the land, as to which he and the
successor will be more similarly situated. In addition, it provides some
comfort that when it comes to enacting land-specific obligations, the
current owner will be more likely to satisfy the preferences of
successors when he must shoulder the same obligations and personally
suffer any diminished property value in exchange for the benefits the
covenant regime provides. As to these preferences, he is reasonably
likely to be a good agent, whereas we would assume no such
competence in binding successors to arbitrary contractual arrangements
that do not primarily concern the important asset the covenanting parties
and his successors have in common.
In sum, private covenants that run with the land are instances of
private laws that will bind others than the enactors, a potential state
action problem. The common law has adopted a substantive
requirement for validity, a second-principle-derived bit of private
Constitutional Law that is modeled after the agency-policing aspect of
public Constitutional Law. Recognizing that these contracts bind others,
we test the legislative output for indicia of good agency-that the
enactors are especially likely to be representative of their successors.
And in this way this corner of Contract Law has adapted to solve a state
action problem.
b. Common-Interest Communities
Consider next the case of common-interest communities, including
homeowners' associations (HOAs) and condominium associations.
These are governing bodies established by covenants, usually called a
"declaration" in this context, in a neighborhood or condominium.9 5
Unlike covenants containing only substantive rights and obligations
(primary rules), declarations also contain secondary rules, often
93. Id.
94. See Turner, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.2 (2000).
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constituting a board that will have ongoing rulemaking authority.96 The
contracting parties creating such an arrangement, and successors in
interest, agree to be bound by future rules made by the privately
established board.97
Quite obviously, board-passed rules are privately made and bind
others than the enactors. We therefore should expect a state action
problem, a mismatch between ordinary private Constitutional Law,
which insists on and then assumes consent, and the sorts of defects that
could befall the private lawmaking body. Because rules passed by the
board do not require the consent of every property owner, even in the
weaker sense of taking property with notice of such rules, there is a
potential that self-interested lawmaking could occur and produce
inefficient results.
Recognizing potential private calculation and distributive problems,
states have placed restrictions on this form of private lawmaking. There
are procedural restrictions, first-principle-derived rules meant to
produce lawmaking entities more likely to be atomically competent.
Given the similarity of the institutional problem, it should not be
surprising that these rules require boards to be selected and operated
somewhat like democratically elected legislatures. 98 After all, these
first-principle-derived rules are, in each setting, attempting to solve ex
ante the agency problems inherent in making law for others.
Of more interest for the present Article, though, are the second-
principle-derived metalaws special to these arrangements. Unlike
private lawmakers entering a covenant, HOA boards offer no assurance
even of initial competence. The board does not itself feel, as
covenanting parties do, even all the initial effects of the laws it makes.
Some of the costs of its rules will immediately be borne by others. And
so, it must be a good agent not only for successors in interest but for
other members of the HOA whose consent will not be required for its
laws to go into effect. 9 9 The board, therefore, is in precisely the situation
of any public legislature, and we have an obvious state action problem.
96. See id. § 6.16 (stating governing board's authority to exercise power to bind
members).
97. See id.
98. See GARY A. POLIAKOFF, 1 LAW OF CONDOMINIUM OPERATIONS § 1:14. The
Restatement (Third) of Property states: "[A]n association in a common-interest community is
governed by a board elected by its [members]. The board is entitled to exercise all powers of the
community except those reserved to the members." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 6.16 (2000).
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.14 (2000) (explaining duties of
directors and officers of common-interest communities to act in good faith, to act in compliance
with law and declaration, to deal fairly, and to use ordinary care and prudence).
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The move the law has made has been to permit such private
lawmaking but to subject it to second-principle analysis characteristic of
public Constitutional Law. Board-passed rules are subject to judicial
review for reasonableness. 00 There is considerable debate as to how
deferential this review should be, but it is surely more rigorous than the
default private Constitutional Law standard of unconscionability. While
a claim of unconscionability is likely to fail when the facts (procedural
and substantive) do not cast suspicion on the voluntary nature of the
contract, a claim that a board-passed rule is unreasonable goes to the
substantive merits of the rule.' 01 In addition to general review for
reasonableness, legislatures and courts have imported more specific
public principles into review of board-passed rules, including
prohibitions on rules limiting speech, assembly, and religion.102
As with the general case of covenants that run with the land, private
laws made in common-interest communities present an obvious state
action problem. Legislatures and courts have responded predictably by
importing those minimal first- (ex ante, procedural) and second- (ex
post, substantive) principle constraints from public Constitutional Law
needed to avert it.
100. See id. § 6.7; see also, e.g., Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313, 1319 (D.C: 1986)
(assessing the reasonableness of a rule prohibiting unit owners from parking cars without
current registration); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (describing the test for rules adopted by condominium associations as one of
reasonableness).
101. Exactly how deferential this substantive review should be is a matter of some
disagreement, with some jurisdictions adopting something like the business judgment rule,
which mainly looks for substance indicative of self-dealing, and others doing more aggressive
cost-benefit-style second guessing. See Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities:
Standards of Review and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 663, 676-97 (2000)
(discussing different levels of substantive review). The institutional theory of state action
suggests that the latter might normally be the better approach, unless living within a community
is a stronger than normal signal of voluntary submission to the types of rule at issue. I have in
mind here religious communities and perhaps others bound together by conscience more than by
ordinary property preferences. See generally Eduardo M. Peflalver, Property as Entrance, 91
VA. L. REv. 1889, 1967-71 (2005).
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1353.6 (West 2007) (barring, with some exceptions,
common-interest developments from "prohibit[ing] posting or displaying of noncommercial
signs, posters, flags, or banners"); FLA. STAT. § 718.123(1) (2010) ("No [condominium] shall
unreasonably restrict any unit owner's right to peaceably assemble or right to invite public
officers or candidates for public office to appear and speak in common elements, common areas,
and recreational facilities."); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (2010) ("[N]o [condominium]
rule or regulation may impair any rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States . . . .").
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3. The Second Step: Judicial Intervention
As the examples above illustrate, a circumstance that presents a
problem for a legal system does not necessarily have a single solution.
In fact, it may not even present a problem that must be solved.
Problematic cases create tension in legal systems, exerting some
pressure for a better justified doctrine. But that is a long way from
saying that the legal system must respond in a particular way. The
existence of a state action problem does not logically imply that courts
must be free to apply public Constitutional Law to formally private
lawmaking. That could be one solution, but, like other potential
solutions, it carries costs. Judicial resolution must therefore be justified,
not assumed as valid or appropriate.
The institutional perspective allows us to see that legal systems do in
fact respond to state action problems in several ways other than through
a judicially administered state action doctrine. The response to state
action problems can and has come from legislatures. common law
courts, states, and the federal government.103 Viewing the problem this
way, it becomes clear that the application by a federal court of the state
action doctrine to cure a state action problem is a last resort. The
doctrine steps in to apply public constitutional rules only if all other
public entities have failed to supply secondary rules responsive to the
peculiar failings of the private institution in front of it, and I will argue
perhaps not even then.
The state action doctrine as we know it is, therefore, a body of law
intended to solve a coupled problem of institutional regulation. First, is
the lawmaking at issue, though formally private, so unlike stereotypical
private conduct or lawmaking that the institutional controls of ordinary,
private Constitutional Law are inadequate? Second, is there a reason for
courts to attempt to solve the problem by imposing the public
Constitutional Law it applies to public lawmaking?
This second question is a weighty one, and it is impossible to make
sense of our state action doctrine without paying careful attention to it.
When should federal courts take it upon themselves to attempt to solve
the constitutional mismatch by finding state action and imposing public
Constitutional Law on private actors? A reasonable state action doctrine
would apply public constitutional rules when (1) analysis of the first
question reveals there is a state action problem and (2) endemic
institutional failures prevent other public institutions from supplying
more appropriate secondary rules for which public Constitutional Law
is an acceptable substitute. Resort by federal courts to a meat cleaver
103. See supra Subsection ILB.2.a-b (discussing legislative and common law responses to
state actionstate action problems of covenants and common-interest communities).
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when perhaps a scalpel is all that is required surely ought to be rare,
and, indeed, it is.
The examples of state action problems discussed in the last
Subsection demonstrate the desirability of forbearance by constitutional
courts in favor of smaller-scale adjustment by other lawmaking bodies.
Classes of like cases raising state action problems, such as HOA
disputes, can be addressed by modestly importing only certain elements
of public Constitutional Law. Where private legislation notwithstanding
unavoidable state action problems is desirable and a category of such
legislation is identifiable, a special class of metalaw can be developed.
The state action doctrine, though, is used to decide cases in which
state action problems fall all the way through the system, unremedied
by other legislative or judicial efforts. When all available metalaw has
been exhausted but still found wanting, what is a court to do? If the only
option left is to apply public Constitutional Law, declaring the
lawmaking entity a public one despite its formal status, should the court
take that dramatic step to remedy the state action problem?
The position of a court confronting an unresolved state action
problem is similar to that of a court confronting Equal Protection
analysis of a legislatively imposed inequality. The issue in that case is
not simply whether there is an inequality, for all laws create
inequalities, but whether it is the kind that justifies a court's overriding
an existing legislative choice and eliminating the possibility of a future
legislative remedy.' 04
The relevance of comparative institutional analysis for the state
action doctrine has been noted by David Strauss, who observed that
"expanding the category of 'state action' is a way of putting the courts
in charge of a problem." 05 Strauss then explained that the Carolene
Products theory of the Equal Protection Clause-focusing scrutiny on
those suspicious laws that disadvantage political minorities-should
also "influence[] the interpretation of the state action doctrine" on
account of "courts' superior capacity to deal with race discrimination
issues." 1 06
104. Cf 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3(a)(i) (4th ed. 2008) (discussing the Court's considerations in
determining whether to override legislative choices under Equal Protection analysis).
105. David A. Strauss, State Action after the Civil Rights Era, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 409,
413 (1993).
106. Id. (referring to Justice Harlan F. Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("It is unnecessary to consider
now ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied
upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." (citations omitted))).
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Strauss has it right. The very same tertiary doctrines that guide
courts in reviewing discriminatory laws should serve to define their role
in applying the state action doctrine. In both contexts, after all, the
concern is with relative institutional capacity to ensure adherence to
constitutional commitments. This two-step institutional theory of state
action tells us when, how, and why courts should consider their
institutional competence. The political failure in state action cases lies
in the appearance of unregulated private laws that present state action
problems. Put another way, the courts must look for situations in which
private Constitutional Law inadequately regulates private lawmaking.
But spotting such a situation, like spotting a law that discriminates, is
insufficient. In both cases, courts must then decide whether they are
better positioned than other institutions to remedy the situation. 0 And
Carolene Products, as Strauss indicated, 0 8 provides a reason and
method for doing so.
I proceed from the assumption that the development of private
Constitutional Law, including invalidating private efforts that amount to
public legislation, ought generally to be left to legislatures and,
secondarily, to administrative agencies and common law courts, both of
which are subject to legislative override. This starting point is justified
by a prior commitment to political branch prerogative over political
decisions, including those affecting the line between collective and
individual control over society.
III. A COMPARISON OF THE THEORIES IN ACTION
The previous Part introduced the institutional state action doctrine, a
two-step institutional analysis. Legal systems generally require
secondary rules that supply solutions to the problem of classifying
lawmaking actors as public or private. Breaking the problem into a first-
stage analysis of the characteristics of the lawmaking entity
(identification of state action problems) and a second-stage analysis of
comparative institutional advantage in providing a solution (deciding
whether courts should intervene) may not make every hard case easy,
but it at least has the advantage of helping us to understand why they
are hard.
In this Part, I explain how the institutional state action theory is in
practice reflected in the American legal system and how it can be
107. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 104, § 18.3(a)(i) ("To the extent that the
Justices independently determine whether the law has a purpose which conforms to the
Constitution and whether the classification in fact relates to that purpose, the Justices are taking
the position that the Court is able to assess these issues in a manner superior to, or at least
different from, the determination of the legislature.").
108. See infra Section III.A.
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further integrated. I argue that the Supreme Court's state action
decisions have largely, but not entirely, stumbled upon the correct
solutions. In doing so, they may appear unprincipled, but this is only
because they in fact grapple with each of the two steps of the
institutional state action theory despite talking as though there is but
one.
Although the Court has offered a variety of these arguments to
support the line of state action decisions, none is sufficient to account
for it. The institutional approach clears much of the confusion by
disaggregating the two different inquiries. For example, the two-step
approach explains why cases involving racial discrimination are more
appropriate targets for state action findings in a way that few other
theories can.
A. Taxonomy
The Court and commentators have provided a number of rhetorical
positions that might map onto theoretical commitments underlying the
state action doctrine. I label these Doctrinal Factors, Pure Balancing,
Substance-Sensitive Balancing, State Support, Formal Identification,
and Power. Each fails to capture important intuitions the others identify.
And each attempts to paper over the difficult problems, either by
ignoring them and making peace with instances of poor governance or
by devolving them to courts to handle on an ad hoc basis. Another
approach, recently pursued by Vikram Amar,109 comes closest to the
analysis I propose here. It is, laudably, functional in nature and
appropriately enlarges the range of intuitions to consult in thinking
about state action cases to include, among other things, institutional
concems.110
1. Doctrinal Factors
The first approach is an umbrella under which the other state action
theoretical intuitions can be deployed as needed. It looks for
touchstones of state action, components that can be balanced-though
not a pure balance of rights like the balancing approaches I discuss
below. Recall that the Supreme Court has identified diverse pathways to
finding state action, including various forms of state participation and
the performance by the putative state actor of a "public function.""'
109. See generally Amar, supra note 6, at 424-29 (arguing that certain functional
considerations present a preferable approach to state action analysis).
I10. See id.
111. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96
(2001).
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Even after one of these routes proves to be available, state action is
not found when competing values of sufficient weight exist. In
Brentwood, Justice Souter cited a case involving a public defender
acting within the scope of her duties.112 Public employment would
normally qualify as a sufficient nexus to find state action, but in Polk
County v. Dodson, the public defender was employed as the state's
adversary rather than its agent." 3
Other relevant factors might include the monopoly position of the
actor,"l 4 the degree to which the action interferes with some important,
constitutionally significant policy, the coercive power of the private
entity, and the nature of the rights at stake on each side of the litigation.
Some of these, as discussed below, are the hearts of theories urged as
replacements for the Court's ad hoc approach.
The deficiency of this method of finding state action is clear. Not
only does it fail to identify the institutional problems that functionally
justify the doctrine, but it does not specify a method at all. The ad hoc
approach is, essentially, a delegation to judges to use intuition-the sort
of solution one might strike upon to resolve a problem that seems too
complex for an algorithm but as to which "knowing it when you see it"
seems to work most of the time. The true effect, though, is to generate
politically acceptable answers in difficult and charged state action cases.
2. Power
The Power theories posit that public constitutional norms ought to
apply to "powerful" private entities. "Power" is a relative term, and
might refer either to (1) the quality of the power a private entity wields
or (2) the extent to which a private entity can control other private
parties. Examples of the former include arguments that there exists a
category of functions that are inherently governmental. When a private
party exercises such governmental powers, it is their quality as
governmental that causes a court to apply public constitutional
norms.' 15 The Supreme Court found state action in Terry v. Adams,
citing the governmental nature of the power of a private organization
that had de facto authority over candidates for election.116 But in Flagg
112. Id. at 303 (discussing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
113. Id. at 303-04.
114. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1978) (noting the importance of the
monopolistic position in public function analysis).
115. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: The "Government Function"
and "Power Theory" Approaches, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 757, 776-77 (1979); Ralph K. Winter,
Jr., Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the Welfare State, 1979
WASH. U. L. Q. 741, 744 (1979).
116. 345 U.S. 461,469 (1953).
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Bros. and Jackson, the Supreme Court found that private exercises of
arguably governmental functions were not sufficient on their own to
constitute state action.11 7
The latter type of power theory, focusing on the extent that a private
party has power over other parties, certainly overlaps the former. Rather
than focus on the kinds of powers governments typically have, it is
fundamentally concerned with ensuring constitutional constraints on de
facto coercive authority." 8 Coercion, not traditional governmental
functions, is the criterion for finding state action.
Power theories are on the right track, but the structural theory more
precisely describes and handles the source of the state action difficulty.
Very often, "powerful" private actors and combinations of such actors
can be coercive in a way that mirrors legislative command. But there are
at least two problems with letting the solution to the Categorization
Problem turn solely on an estimate of the private party's power.
First, "power" is an imprecise term. A powerful private actor may be
one that can easily accomplish its own ends, but it may not have a
legislative-like ability to coerce other private parties. Some large
corporations, for example, are powerful in the sense that they dominate
their respective markets, obtaining perhaps the best deals on supplies,
but not in the sense that they can coerce others. Like fuzzy inquiries into
whether a course of conduct is generally public or private, asking
whether an entity is powerful asks many questions at once and invites
conflicting answers, with no criteria for sifting among them for the
answer most responsive to the concerns animating the inquiry in the
first place.119
But even if power is understood to mean the ability to control a
significant portion of the community, the power theory does no more
than identify potential state action problems. Because the power theory
is not rooted in a deeper understanding of the institutional problems
behind the state action inquiry, it may not even do a good job of that.
Looking for power or coercion should be proxies for the real inquiry:
whether the private actor is inadequately regulated by private
Constitutional Law. After all, Contract Law already makes the
117. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 161 (finding no state action on grounds that "the settlement
of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function"
(emphasis added)); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (declining to
find state action concerning privately owned utility company providing essential public service).
118. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection
of Personal Rights From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942-51
(1952) (analyzing the theory that large corporations, because they are creatures of the state and
exert great economic control over the citizenry, should be subject to constitutional restraints).
119. See infra Subsection III.B.1.
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enforcement of contracts contingent on voluntarism and includes
prohibitions on unconscionable contracts or those entered under duress.
Powerful entities in competition for customers are often not in a
position to dictate terms to those customers. The point here is that
economic power, as such, is not sufficient to show the existence of a
state action problem. To the extent that it is used as an indicator, it must
be remembered that it is only evidence of the problem but is not itself
the problem.
At least, though, conditioning state action on a private party's
possession of power is roughly aligned with the underlying institutional
question-if power is understood as the ability to gain the compliance
of others without true consent. Its imprecision, though, is compounded
by the theory's failure to provide guidance to courts as to whether they,
as opposed to other institutions, should regulate the private power at
issue. It misses the second step of the two-part state action theory.
The power theory conceives of Constitutional Law horizontally, as a
separate body of rights-protecting provisions that at the very least
constrains public agents but that has no direct similarity to private
contract law. It does not understand public Constitutional Law as a
regulatory option parallel to the private Constitutional Law of our
contract law, one that serves the same purposes but with a different
institutional target.120 Perhaps for this reason, the theory is not
expansive enough to allow courts to forbear finding state action when
other institutions are sufficiently competent to amend the private
Constitutional Law that would ordinarily govern. In short, the power
theory-because it does not fully comprehend the institutional
problem-fails to distinguish the problem of poorly regulated private
entities from the question of whether courts are the proper public bodies
to solve that problem.
3. Balancing
Balancing theories treat the state action question as a question of
costs and benefits. Applying public constitutional constraints to a
private actor imposes autonomy-restricting obligations on that actor; for
example, by restricting the actor's ability to discriminate among
potential business associates. On the other hand, not applying those
constraints permits private actors to impose burdens on others. A
balancing theory attempts to pick an optimal regulatory solution to this
problem of alternative costs by asking a judge to weigh them.
The key to this approach is a conviction that constitutional rights are
positive entitlements. For example, a private employee who faces
120. See supra Section II.A.
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termination if he or she expresses certain political views has suffered an
abridgment of his or her freedom of speech. Although the Constitution
is not formally concerned with this type of abridgment, a balancing
view understands this speech restriction as a constitutionally cognizable
cost. When this cost is greater than the constitutional costs that would
be realized by imposing public Constitutional Law on the adverse
private actor, a balancing theory would find state action.
Erwin Chemerinsky is perhaps the staunchest advocate of the
balancing approach, arguing that the state action doctrine should be
eliminated and replaced with a balancing test.121 But other
commentators also have urged some form of balancing test.122 Pure
balancing theories normally depend on denying the reality of a formal
line between public and private action.123 The question of state action is,
for these theorists, one of a policy concerning those competing personal
interests that have resonance in the language of rights.
As the Supreme Court put it in Marsh: "Whether a corporation or a
municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an
identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner
that the channels of communication remain free."I 4 Rights, in this
formulation, are immunities that travel with the actor, guarding against
involuntary abrogation from whatever the source, only yielding when
weightier rights are at stake on the other side.
A variation on the balancing theory, substance-sensitive balancing,
also takes its cue from Marsh, and understands that the nature of the
rights on either side is perhaps more important than any quantitative
understanding of the degree of infringement of those rights. For
example, the Court in Marsh stated, "When we balance the
Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of the people
121. Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 506.
122. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 37, at 7-8 (arguing that rather than
searching for a unitary state action formula, courts should consider three aspects: (1) the
personal interests of the parties; (2) the impact on these personal interests of a decision whether
national authority may intervene; and (3) the effect of such a decision on the policy of
encouraging local responsibility).
123. See, e.g., Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296, 1301 (1982) (noting that the state is implicated "in every
'private' action not prohibited by law"); Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 524 ("[S]tate action is
present in all private violations of constitutional rights."); Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E.
Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976
SUP. CT. REv. 221, 229-30 (1976) (arguing that a state permitting "unconstitutional" private
action no less deprives the injured citizen of his rights than a state affirmatively infringing on
those rights).
124. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,507 (1946).
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to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position."l25
The rhetorical approach here suggests that while a balance is a
"must," the weights of rights on either side depend on their nature. The
First Amendment rights of speakers, the Court observed, are
"fundamental," lying "at the foundation of free government." 26 On the
other hand, the public-like operation of the property diminished the
private property rights to exclude: "The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it."1 2 7 The Court argues that, in a
balance of constitutionally cognizable harms, not all infringements are
the same.
The trouble with using a balancing approach illustrates the benefits
of the institutional theory. First, as a theory of selecting between private
and public Constitutional Law, it fails miserably. A balance of rights is
likely to be insensitive to the institutional considerations that have led to
the distinctions between the two bodies of secondary laws. Instead, the
balancing focuses on the relative impact on the parties of the decision
whether to apply public Constitutional Law rather than private
Constitutional Law, without explicitly focusing on public Constitutional
Law's comparative advantages and disadvantages to private
Constitutional Law. While that determination could possibly replicate
the suitability analysis I have urged, it would do so only indirectly while
being resistant to rule-like formulations and the creation of categories.
And weighing impacts to rights obscures, rather than illuminates, the
state action doctrine; even a constitutional regulation that results in little
cognizable harm to a state action defendant might be a very poor
regulation, in that the state action defendant has no cognizable reason to
serve as the agent of the plaintiff or the public at large.
Second, the theory leaves no room for other institutions to solve state
action problems in more finely tuned ways. Balancing would cause the
state action determination to turn only on a judicial evaluation of
competing rights. A critical aspect to resolving these difficult cases is
the introspection and evaluation of the political landscape that the
second step of the institutional analysis requires. Some balancing
approaches would allow courts to consider such things, 128 but it would
be better to acknowledge that the second step is a threshold, not a factor.
125. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 506.
128. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 37, at 34-35 (arguing for a consideration
of the impact of finding state action on the policy of local control in a test that would otherwise
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4. Formal Identification
Some commentators have rejected altogether courts' unilateral
application of public constitutional principles to entities that are not
formally public.129 For example, Richard Kay argues that the
Constitution should protect individual rights only against abrogation by
Congress, the President, and other state and federal agents acting under
controlling law. 130 Although this approach would represent a radical
departure from the Court's doctrine, being inconsistent with Shelley and
Marsh to name the most obvious examples, it is not entirely inconsistent
with the abstract state action doctrine.
The Formal approach does not deny the existence of state action
problems, and it does not argue against regulations that import public
constitutional principles to solve such problems. But it does deny that
step two should, in a significant category of cases, be resolved to permit
courts to provide such regulations. That, after all, is what step two does.
It asks courts to resolve whether other institutions are capable of
supplying needed public-oriented regulations on private actors and, if
not, whether the courts are. One might believe courts should always
resolve this in the negative on grounds that they are never better suited
than other branches to solve the problem or on grounds that, perhaps
empirically, there are almost always other institutions that, even if
laboring under some detriment with respect to the question, have the
capacity to provide responsive solutions.
Terry and Shelley are but two important data points that help show
why this view is mistaken. In each case, the existing private
Constitutional Law was controlled by majoritarian forces that had an
active interest in helping to subvert the goals of public Constitutional
Law.131 Concerted private action was actually used as a substitute for
legislation, while the governing private Constitutional Law was
designed for other, more disaggregated forms of private action.1 32 But
the reason this substitution was effective, the reason that other
institutions failed to supplement the private Constitutional Law
applicable to these defendants, was the complicity of the legislature,
marking a failure of majoritarian politics to align private secondary
balance the harms of the decision to private parties).
129. See, e.g., John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83
N.C. L. REv. 569, 574 (2005) (advocating a formal approach to state action that recognizes
"without exception that only governmental actors are subject to constitutional rules").
130. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 342-43 (1993).
131. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1948).
132. Terry, 345 U.S. at 469; Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19-20.
322 [Vol. 65
STATEACTIONPROBLEMS
rules with controlling public policy. These cases demonstrate the
essential role that courts can and should play in those rare cases when
serious state action problems are immune from political correction.
Still, there has been support from the Supreme Court for this formal
position, at least in some cases. Justice O'Connor, in Lebron, appeared
to have accepted it: "[T]he conduct of a private actor is not subject to
constitutional challenge if such conduct is 'fundamentally a matter of
private choice and not state action."' 33 Read too strongly, this would
appear to contradict Shelley,134 but I do not think this was Justice
O'Connor's intent. Her position was, rather, a useful articulation of an
intuition, one the institutional theory makes explicit: that courts may not
normally be the best bodies to apply substantive, constitutional-type
restrictions in areas ordinarily governed by private Constitutional Law.
5. Functional Theories
More recent efforts to understand the state action miasma have made
strides forward by focusing on function rather than debates over
malleable, formal labels. Vikram Amar has set out three possible
groundings for a functional state action theory, the first two of which
are institutional in nature.135 First, he cites federalism as a possible
reason to avoid expanding the category of actors against whom the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses apply.136 If these clauses'
application is broad, then so too is Congress's enforcement power under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment-broad "in a way that
133. Lebron v. Nat'1 R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 409 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting)). In the Establishment Clause context, Justice Thomas has similarly written in
support of a strong, formal public-private distinction: "If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is
neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through
the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid
elsewhere, the government has not provided any 'support of religion."' Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 816 (2000) (plurality opinion).
134. The obvious counterargument is that Shelley involved a willing buyer and willing
seller, prevented from transacting by the state. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 19. That, however, would be
a formalistic evasion of what happened. The covenant at issue represented a regulatory right of a
neighbor that would ordinarily be called a property right and enforced, regardless of the wishes
of sellers and buyers. The dispute in Shelley arose because of the private choices of neighbors to
grant each other regulatory rights regarding racial exclusion.
135. Amar, supra note 6, at 425-29. The third is that "many constitutional rules would be
unreasonably intrusive if we applied them to all private behavior," and so the doctrine that
insists on state action before applying them protects a "cluster of privacy and autonomy
considerations." Id. at 429. That is indeed a function of the default categorization. At the least, it
describes typical values behind the political choices concerning which activities should
generally be left to Contract Law and its consent-based structure.
136. Id. at 425-26.
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threatens local autonomy, experimentation, and compromise that
considers and balances local conditions and complexities." 3 7 Although
Amar concludes that the breadth of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause currently renders this concern of little practical
importance, it does echo the second step of the institutional theory.' 38
His citation of separation of powers as a second functional justification
goes even further in the direction of the second step.' 39 First noting the
general preference for policymaking by legislatures, Amar echoes the
justifications for the second step of the institutional theory: that
legislatures are better at gathering data and crafting finely tuned rules
that are more responsive to the detailed circumstances of the regulated
actors. 140
This line of thinking is similar to the institutional approach. While
Amar would use these functional considerations as part of a more ad
hoc test,141 they at least focus on one important question: the wisdom of
using courts to solve problems like those arising in the canonical state
action cases. The full institutional theory tells us when and how Amar's
justifications, among others, should be deployed. Examples help to
demonstrate how this is so.
B. Institutional Theory in Action
The distinctive character of the institutional theory is better
appreciated with its application. I will briefly analyze the theory's
application to several previously decided state action cases. In doing so,
the contrast with existing theories and doctrine will become clear. The
institutional theory, however, reaches even beyond state action. Once
one understands the problem in state action cases to be one of
mismatched primary and secondary rules, an obvious question arises:
Are there formally public actions that would be better governed by
private Constitutional Law? In other words, are there private action
problems as well as state action problems? I close by arguing that there
are.
1. Shelley
Any state action theory must grapple with Shelley v. Kraemer, the
paradigmatic case raising the Categorization Problem. 42 First note that
137. Id. at 426.
138. Id. at 426-27.
139. Id. at 427-28.
140. Id. at 428.
141. Id. at 433-37.
142. Esper went so far as to call it "the Taj Mahal of state action problems." Esper, supra
note 42, at 715.
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neither the formal identification theory nor an unmodified power theory
would replicate the result in Shelley. Since the parties making and
enforcing the covenants were undeniably private entities, the formal
identification theory would clearly find that no state action existed.
Although Shelley itself purported to find state action in a court's
enforcement of a private covenant, if that were sufficient, all private
agreements would be subject to public constitutional review before
enforcement. Court enforcement was not a determinative reason for the
decision in Shelley, and so the formal identification of the judge as the
public actor is insufficient.
The power theory likewise fails to harmonize with Shelley unless it
is transformed into a collective-action principle resembling the first step
of the institutional theory. The homeowners seeking to enforce the racist
covenants in Shelley were not the sort of powerful private actors that the
power theory imagines as state-like. Their coercive capacity, with
respect to the issues in Shelley, extended only to a few properties.
Again, if that were sufficient, the power theory would be a nullity, as
every private agreement represents some quantum of power, represented
by the consideration, on each side.
To offer an effective but affirmative answer to the state action
question in Shelley, therefore, the power theory would need a broad
understanding of the entities that a court would analyze in a given case
for state action-triggering power. If it were known that the widespread
use of covenants made it virtually impossible for nonwhites to buy or
occupy homes in white neighborhoods, then we could say that the
market has served a coordinating function, delivering a near-uniform
private rule authored by disaggregated private lawmakers. Perhaps the
sort of power that triggers state action can be found not only in
individually powerful private actors but in aggregations of market actors
who collectively wield power over other market participants.
This conception of the power theory begins to capture the essence of
the first step of the institutional theory. The institutional theory is, first
of all, more precise in its first step. It is not merely the power of the
market in the abstract nor even its power to push a uniform rule that
satisfies the first step, but the coercion to comply with that rule. In
addition, the power theory would still suffer from the lack of a second
step analyzing the institutional appropriateness of courts as state action
problem solvers. This deficiency causes too much to turn on a finding of
''power," as doing so triggers public constitutional review even when
such review is institutionally inappropriate. That is, it fails to
distinguish those cases in which courts are needed to solve the problem
from those in which they are not, and in which court involvement may
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bar better, more finely tuned regulation.143 As a result, the theory would
not be able to explain why race should be a trigger for finding state
action.
The problem is that if the power theory yields the result in Shelley it
proves far too much, for it would dictate the application of public
constitutional rules by courts in every instance of market-coordinated
action by otherwise diffuse private actors. This does not match our
practice, which finds no state action, for example, when markets deliver
certain kinds of automobiles but not others, when markets settle on
particular forms of transacting in real estate, or when a town supports a
few newspapers, none of which are libertarian in viewpoint. None of
these has been found to be state action, and the institutional theory
would not label them state action either, for reasons that will be further
examined below.
In contrast to the Court's holding and other theoretical approaches,
the institutional theory captures the essence of what is really
bothersome about Shelley, distinguishing it from other instances of
covenant enforcement. First, we ask whether the private rules that were
enforced raised unresolved state action problems. As we have seen,144
covenants that run with the land raise, generally, a state action problem.
But this problem is cured by the agency-policing doctrines of, inter alia,
touch and concern.
Shelley, though, involved a further problem. The defect was not the
binding, by an individual covenant, of future landowners by
unrepresentative agents. Rather, there was a state action problem on
account of the widespread use of covenants to create a de facto scheme
of racial segregation. That was the reality in Shelley:
The St. Louis Real Estate Exchange openly coordinated the
city's numerous 'neighborhood improvement associations'
in a widespread pattern of covenanted segregation. Indeed,
widespreadness was exactly what made RRCs [racial
restrictive covenants] so pernicious. A handful of small-
scale RRCs could have been insulting and annoying, but
they could scarcely have had much impact in constricting
of housing opportunities for African Americans. But
widespread RRCs threatened to do just that, in a manner
143. Again, the analogy to Equal Protection may be helpful. The function of levels of
scrutiny is to reserve serious review for those inequalities that courts are best positioned to
remedy relative to legislatures. All laws impose inequalities. Only some of those reveal
institutional defects in legislatures. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Subsection II.B.2.a.
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that was contrary to the ordinary American precepts of
property law favoring free alienability of real estate.
The first step of the institutional theory would find no state action
problem in a world in which racial covenants were isolated occurrences
and provided no general bar to minorities wishing to live in
neighborhoods dominated by majorities.146 Such isolated covenants
would not actually coerce individuals into particular channels, 47 as the
market would provide choice. And the limited coercion involved in
individual covenants is governed by touch and concern and other
doctrines. Therefore, the private act of agreement would have no
compulsory effect on others, making private Constitutional Law, the
ordinary law of covenants, the appropriate body of secondary rules to
govern such acts. 148
This, however, was not the situation in Shelley. And although the
Court failed to grapple with the social reality behind the case, that
reality would be crucial for a direct application of the institutional
theory.149 The fact that the real-estate market operated in a compulsory
way, that as to the segregation mandate there was a monopoly of
practice if not a monopoly of providers, is enough to conclude that the
private agreements at issue, in the aggregate, had binding effects on
nonparties. They were legislative in character, and without the agency-
policing provisions of public Constitutional Law, nothing prevented that
legislation from deviating from what the community requires of public
145. Rose, supra note 3, at 195 (footnote omitted) (citing CLEMENT E. VOSE, CAUCASIANS
ONLY: THE SUPREME COURT, THE NAACP, AND THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT CASES 106-07
(1959)).
146. It is, however, indeed difficult to imagine a world-with our own history-generally
free of racial discrimination but in which there are no state or federal laws prohibiting private
racial discrimination in housing. But it is in such a strange world that Shelley would not have
been needed.
147. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784-87 (1989)
(discussing, in the right of privacy context, the difference between laws that remove options and
laws that coerce by determining courses of conduct).
148. Of course, the presence of a state action problem is not the only reason to regulate a
private transaction. A state's judicially enforceable public policy or legislatively enacted statutes
ought to block even small-scale instances of racial discrimination that have deleterious, if not
compulsory and therefore public in nature, effects on the public interest.
149. In fact, to explain the result, the broader set of facts must have been crucial in the
Supreme Court's indirect application of the same theory. As argued supra, the primary ground
for state action given, judicial enforcement, does not distinguish Shelley from cases in which
there is no state action. It is difficult to believe that the Court would have ruled as it did had
racist covenants not been widespread enough a practice to approach in fact, if not in law, a
racist-zoning scheme.
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legislation. In short, the racist covenant scheme created a state action
problem, unremedied by the state of Missouri.s 0
The institutional theory thus requires that we move to the second
step of the analysis: Are the political institutions peculiarly disabled
from ameliorating the state action problem in this category of cases by
modifying the applicable private Constitutional Law to incorporate the
needed public Constitutional Law principles? In answering this, we see
the important role played by the fact of race discrimination in Shelley.
Indeed, the second step explains why the protection of unpopular
speakers and racial minorities intuitively raises the state action question
where other contents of private rules would scarcely raise an eyebrow.
The counter-majoritarian nature of courts specially qualifies them to
act in cases in which discrete and insular minorities will be unable to
protect themselves within the political institutions.' 5 ' Because the
uncorrected state action problem in Shelley was structurally resistant to
political cure, on account of the relative political powerlessness of those
harmed by the private zoning scheme, the Court was the institution best
situated to solve the problem.152 Cases like Shelley, which involve
coercive private laws that single out political minorities for unfavorable
treatment, reveal institutional failings that justify a preference for
judicial resolution. 5 3
Before leaving Shelley behind, it is worth observing again that the
institutional theory would find that most instances of judicial
enforcement of covenants do not invoke the state action doctrine. In the
vast majority of cases, the only state action problem a covenant might
raise is remedied by the touch and concern doctrine and related, but ex
150. Note that this analysis applies to any market in which (1) there is a near-uniform rule
included in all agreements, (2) there is a monopoly of practice, and (3) the market delivers
something that citizens cannot easily avoid or substitute. Such a market creates a state action
problem but not necessarily one that should be remedied, under the second step, by courts'
application of public Constitutional Law.
151. This is not the only way in which courts may have a clear advantage over other
governmental institutions. Nor, in fact, do they always have this advantage. But it is the one on
which I focus for the present.
152. I admit to harboring some lingering uncertainty, even under the facts in Shelley, about
whether the Court would have been the best situated institution to solve the problem if the
national situation had been a little different. The effect of the state action finding is, perhaps
unfortunately, to remove regulatory discretion from the political branches. Had the political
institutional failure been only at the state level with some significant prospect that Congress
might have or soon develop the capacity to regulate, then there might have been a case for
judicial restraint. Unfortunately, at the time of Shelley, civil rights legislation was years away. In
any event, the longtime failure of any political branches in a circumstance paradigmatic of
political malrepresentation, in my view, strongly supported a state action finding absent clear
signals that a political solution was imminent.
153. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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post, doctrines intended to deprive poorly governing covenants of
effect. It should also be obvious that judicial enforcement outside the
covenant setting is not a trigger for state action.
Even in cases in which the market settles on some options to the
exclusion of others, like in the above example of only certain cars or
newspapers available for purchase, there is almost certainly no state
action. In many cases, we would not make it past the institutional
theory's first step. A market that makes available only televisions over
twenty inches is, indeed, reflective of a privately formulated, if in a
disaggregated manner, rule concerning the appropriate sizes of
televisions. But this rule does not bind others in any significant way. It
is difficult, especially these days, to conceive of the unavailability of
smaller televisions as coercive, as forcing non-consenting others to
conform to the private rule. Opting out of purchase altogether is
possible. Most goods are like this, and, indeed, because of their role in
the receipt of information, televisions are closer to the coercion line
than most.
Disaggregated market forces that do create a private, coercive rule of
the kind that I label a state action problem do not necessarily come
under public Constitutional Law, as very often the second step renders
them inappropriate targets for regulation by courts. Even if we
concluded that television sets, perhaps because of their information-
providing function, were a virtual necessity of citizenship, so that a
market-produced rule providing restrictions on ownership would be
necessarily coercive, the question of whether courts should regulate
such rules with public Constitutional Law would remain to be decided.
One would need a reason to think that the political branches were
structurally unable to do so. Unless the rule provides majority benefits
at minority expense, it is unlikely such a reason exists.
2. Marsh
Marsh v. Alabama arose from a criminal trespass prosecution of a
Jehovah's Witness who continued to distribute reiious literature in a
company-owned town after being asked to leave.1 5 Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation owned land that contained "residential buildings, streets, a
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block,"' all
constituting Gulf's privately owned town called Chickasaw.'s In the
Court's words, "the town and its shopping district are accessible to and
freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish
them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the
154. 326 U.S. 501, 502-03 (1946).
155. Id. at 502.
3292013]1
title to the property belongs to a private corporation."l56 Unlike an
ordinary town, however, the private owners of Chickasaw enforced a
rule prohibiting solicitations of any kind without prior permission, and
they refused to grant permission to Marsh. 5 7
As the Court pointed out, enforcement in an ordinary, public town of
such a rule against a religious proselytizer like Marsh would obviously
be unconstitutional.' 5 8 As the Court put it, the question, then, was
whether "those people who live in or come to Chickasaw [can] be
denied freedom of press and religion simply because a single company
has legal title to all the town?"59 As has been discussed, the Court
performed a rights-sensitive balancing test to decide that the answer was
no. 160
The institutional theory, however, reveals a more complex legal
scene. We first must come to grips with what laws are being applied and
scrutinized. Although she contested her conviction under a criminal
statute, Marsh's argument was not really that the trespass statute itself
was unconstitutional. The argument, in substance, was that the
Constitution barred Gulf from formulating and enforcing the private
rule for granting and revoking licenses on which the trespass statute was
parasitic. 61 That manifested, formally, in a challenge to the trespass
statute as it was applied. But it was Gulf's prior restraint, standardless
licensing, and apparent total bar on Jehovah's Witnesses' proselytizing
that were alleged to be unconstitutional. And, indeed, that was what the
Court analyzed for constitutionality, as was the case for the equivalent,
but public, rules that were analyzed for constitutionality in cases
* 162involving ordinary towns.
Applying the first step of the theory, we ultimately ask whether the
town's rulemaking was poorly governed by private Constitutional Law.
Whether the town's rules amounted to a state action problem depends
on whether they were essentially obligatory on others, so that their
binding nature turned on something other than the consent that private
Constitutional Law assumes. Privately formulated rules for licenses to
visit private homes and most businesses do not have this quality.
Visiting a neighbor and shopping in a particular store are almost always
156. Id. at 503.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 504-05 (citing, inter alia, Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down
a scheme requiring permission from the City Manager before distributing literature of any
kind)).
159. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505.
160. Id. at 509.
161. Id. at 504.
162. Id. at 504-05.
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voluntary in a pure sense. Dislike of the rules of one establishment will
lead to visiting another.'6 3
An entire town is another matter. Exit is, of course, formally an
option. But a town, as a collection of residents and businesses, is such
an interactive locus that avoiding it becomes increasingly difficult with
its size. As avoidance becomes more difficult, the inference grows that
appearing there and remaining there are driven by needs that, for many,
make the terms of the license essentially compulsory. In that case, it
would be impossible to say that the private lawmakers-the parties to
the license-made a welfare-enhancing decision by exchanging core
freedoms for the right to use ordinary town-like resources.
More importantly, even if many individuals in Chickasaw had truly
made a Pareto efficient exchange with Gulf, the private rule barred
others who found the terms of the rule unacceptable. Even though exit
was an option, the private rule promulgated by Chickasaw and
cooperated in by town residents and businesspersons had a binding
effect on outsiders-barring them not just from a particular business
among many but from an entire region of commerce. The point, in this
step, is not to make a judgment about whether doing so violates
fundamental liberties, whatever those might be. Rather, we need only
establish that the rule had regulatory effects on those who did not make
it but would nonetheless have to live under it. The licensing rule of an
individual establishment does not, in general, have this property. But as
the area covered by the private rule increases, so too does the regulatory
effect.
Perhaps a single, private town, especially one composed of like-
minded adherents to an alternative normative regime, does not raise a
state action problem.' 64 In such a case, the role of consent is far greater,
in that the more separatist the community, the more its rules can be seen
to result from private, institutional competence, and the less we should
be concerned that others will be swept into a regime they had no hand in
making on account of the economic and geographic power of the town.
Chickasaw was, as the Supreme Court pointed out, not at all distinct
from ordinary private towns.' 65
Moreover, the very idea of a private town was not at all unusual.
While today company towns seem antiquated,166 the Marsh Court noted
163. The problem of a uniform rule among disaggregated private entities-a rule barring
all women, for example, from all of a town's shops where no one shop is essential-is taken up
infra.
164. Pefialver, supra note 101, at 1967-71.
165. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503.
166. But not unheard of. See HARDY GREEN, THE COMPANY TowN 6 (2010) (identifying
Columbus, Indiana, and Coming, New York, as company towns that live on, and proclaiming
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that they were common at the time. "In the bituminous coal industry
alone, approximately one-half of the miners in the United States lived in
company-owned houses in the period from 1922-1923. The percentage
varied from 9 per cent in Illinois and Indiana and 64 per cent in
Kentucky, to almost 80 per cent in West Virginia."1 67 If there were
near-uniform rules across many of these towns, it would support the
finding of a state action problem, as the uniformity of covenant practice
did in Shelley. Here, though, it would suffice to find a state action
problem if there were a single, company-owned town sufficiently
integrated into (even if not the whole of) the local economy, so that
avoidance was a significant burden.
As to the second step, the above discussion is highly relevant. Recall
that we ask in this step whether the Court should undertake what ought
to be a highly unusual step. Should it apply the public Constitution to
private conduct, breaking with the formal identification theory? The
institutional theory argues that it should only do so when the Court is far
better suited, at the margin, to solve a state action problem than other
institutions are. The most common, though possibly not the only, reason
the Court might be best suited to solve such a problem is that the private
rule disadvantages a group that lacks political power to protect itself in
other areas of government.168
Marsh, like Shelley, does seem to be a case involving a private rule
presenting a state action problem that discriminates against political
minorities. It is a situation in which it might be difficult for other
institutions to introduce ameliorating public-law-inspired secondary
rules into the governing private Constitutional Law. Perhaps that is
enough, but perhaps in exercising this blunt and unusual authority, the
Court could look more deeply into the likelihood that the state would
better represent minority interests in private towns in the future. Is there
already an extensive regulation of such towns, in which speaker
protection is a lacuna? And if so, are there regulations that could lead us
to believe that the lack of protection here is unintentional, owing to lack
of foresight? These sorts of questions attempt to gauge the need for
unusual federal court intervention.
In Marsh, there is at least some indication that the Court recognized
that the state had no intention of wielding any unusual regulatory
authority: "The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right of a
corporate campuses like Pepsico's Purchase, New York, and Google's Googleplex in Mountain
View, California, to be examples of a new form of company town).
167. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508 n.5.
168. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests."' 69 In the end,
Alabama's apparent lack of interest in solving the state action problem
in Marsh and the Court's apparent concern that privately owned towns
were a significant feature of the cultural landscape, primarily populated
by miners and workers of modest means, probably justified its view that
it had an institutional advantage in setting second-principle baselines-
here, prohibiting private rules discriminating against speakers.
3. Other Cases
In Terry v. Adams, a private group in Texas, the Jaybird Democrats,
held private elections restricted to whites. 70 Its membership included,
by definition, all white voters in the county.' 7 ' Candidates ran within the
organization, and victorious candidates would then run unopposed in
the Democratic primary, in which the losers of the private primary did
not appear.172 The effect was to create an all-white primary. 7 3 The
Supreme Court found the procedure unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment, holding that "[t]he Jaybird primary has become an integral
part, indeed the only effective part, of the elective process that
determines who shall rule and govern in the county" and that "[t]he
effect of the whole procedure . .. is to do precisely that which the
Fifteenth Amendment forbids."l 74
The institutional theory handles the case in a straightforward
manner. The rules of the Jaybird Party, though formally private, were
binding on nonmembers, namely nonwhite voters. These rules,
therefore, created an obvious state action problem. Further, under step
two, the need for federal court intervention could not have been plainer.
We have in Terry an attempt at racial discrimination in elective office,
in a situation in which the suspicion is high that the state has willfully
decided not to regulate on its own and in which the minority groups
harmed by the private rule lack the political representation that could
effectively win regulation. 175
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, a private electricity company
had a state-sanctioned monopoly on service to a particular area of
Pennsylvania.' 7 6 Because of the nature of the service it provided, it was
heavily regulated by the state. The plaintiff alleged that the company
169. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-06.
170. 345 U.S. 461, 462-63 (1953).
171. Id. at 463.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 469-70.
175. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
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had turned off her electric service without due process of law.176
Asserting that the company's termination of her service was state
action, she sought to challenge the termination rules under the more
aggressive second-principle derived rules of due process instead of the
second-principle derived rules of unconscionability (and related
doctrines). 77
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a Court that had passed the high-water
marks of state action reached in cases like Shelley, Marsh, and Terry,
disclaimed reliance on the asserted monopoly status of the utility or of
its connection with the public interest.' 7  Rather, looking for a concrete
connection between formal state officials and the conduct in the case,
the Court found nothing "to connect the State of Pennsylvania with
respondent's action so as to make the latter's conduct attributable to the
State."l 79
Jackson is interesting, because rules promulgated by a monopoly
provider of electricity surely present state action problems. Both the
majority and some justices in dissent failed to appreciate the quality of
the argument that electricity is an "essential public service."180 That
description of electrical service is another. way of observing that
citizens, in the modern day, cannot realistically opt out of procuring it.
And if the provider is a monopoly, so that shopping for service involves
moving one's abode, then the provider's privately created rules will not
be well-governed by private Constitutional Law that assumes consent.
And, indeed, heavy state regulation of utilities is intended to be
responsive to this state action problem.
The Jackson case is difficult because of the second step. On the one
hand, lax termination procedures that affect mainly customers who have
trouble paying their bills would seem to be the sort of rules that might
176. Id.
176. Id. at 348.
177. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
178. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351-53.
179. Id. at 358.
180. See, e.g., id. at 353 (rejecting "the contention that the furnishing of utility services is
either a state function or a municipal duty"); id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognizing the
functional importance of how essential a service is but focusing on traditional association with
government). The narrow view, the "find the state" view, of essential public services arises
because of the lack of a second step in the state action analysis. Justice Marshall speculated that
the majority's reluctance to apply due process to the company was "likely guided in part by its
reluctance to impose on a utility company burdens that might ultimately hurt consumers more
than they would help them." Id. at 373. This, he suggested, was owing to the expense of
hearings and the like. Id. The two-step institutional theory would recognize situations in which a
superficially unresolved state action problem was in fact a best-interests, legislative solution to
the problem. Where it is not clear that courts are needed to resolve such problems, they should
leave them for better equipped political institutions.
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not receive enough political attention to be well-regulated. On the other
hand, there were in fact state efforts to solve these problems, as
reflected by the extensive regulatory environment in which the company
operated.'' The very reasons Justice Douglas cited to support the
presence of state action, namely the degree of the state's involvement in
requiring the company's rules to include an obligation to provide
reasonable notice, are reasons to suspect that federal court involvement
may be inappropriate. 182 Where the state is already involved in
importing public constitutional principles into the secondary law
governing private parties, courts should be leery of displacing that role,
absent signals that the state is committed, because of capture or
incapacity, to poor governance. Critical to deciding whether this is the
case might be direct evidence of private capture, evidence of other areas
within the regulations that irrationally disfavor poorer residents, or even
individual regulations so deficient that they are difficult to explain
without reference to institutional bias. 83
Justice Marshall suggested that the problem of courts' imposing due
process rules on private parties, displacing private preferences for
public conceptions of fairness between the parties, could be ameliorated
by "allowing various private institutions the flexibility to select
procedures that fit their particular needs."1 84 In areas in which the
political institutions are not peculiarly disabled from doing so, such
flexibility in regulations responsive to state action problems could well
come about. Importantly, the design of such means is almost certainly
better produced administratively or legislatively (or even by common
law courts adopting, instead of due process explicitly, modestly
heightened unconscionability standards for certain classes of cases) than
by federal courts. While Justice Marshall argued that the Court's finding
state action would not necessarily mean an all-or-nothing application of
state-like procedural rules, his argument also tends to promote the
relative desirability of administrative rather than judicial regulation.' 85
181. Id. at 357 ("The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a
utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices
a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a
regulatory body.").
182. Id. at 361-62 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
183. I should also emphasize that the state's own secondary regulations are themselves
subject to constitutional review. To the extent that they mandate procedures that are deficient,
there is no question of state action standing in the way.
184. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 372 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. See, e.g., Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to full
enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of
such regulations.").
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4. Private Action Problems
The institutional approach to state action reorients the inquiry from
finding an exception to private actor immunity to the Constitution to
responding to the Categorization Problem of public and private
lawmakers. Once this move is made, it is obvious to ask whether the
categorization can be problematic in the other direction. Can public
Constitutional Law be a poor match for a formally public entity that, as
to particular actions, functionally resembles a private entity?
Taking a cue from the methods we used to identify instances of
private lawmaking that are poorly governed by private Constitutional
Law, mainly looking for laws that had some de facto binding effect on
non-consenting parties, we might ask whether there are public officials
whose rulemaking primarily affects a governmental interest in a way
that we desire to be self-interested. The prevailing characteristic of
private lawmaking as self-interested is what led us to insist on consent
as, in general, a primary criterion to gauge the appropriateness of the
usual private Constitutional Law regime. Public Constitutional Law, in
contrast, is generally premised on ensuring good agency for broader
public interests.
A search for situations in which, contra the usual, self-interest in
relation to a citizen is an appropriate governmental objective leads us to
the case of public employee speech. Government entities, of course,
have very limited authority to impose consequences on speech by
private persons. But government entities are also expected to be
effective, and their interest in running an office efficiently is similar to
that of a private employer. As the Supreme Court put it in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, "Government employers, like private employers, need a
significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions;
without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of
public services."186 In other words, ordinary public Constitutional Law
would do a poor job regulating government in its role as employer, in
which it should pursue, to some extent, self-interested policies. 1
186. 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). See also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the
government as sovereign.").
187. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75 ("Rather, the extra power the government has in
this area comes from the nature of the government's mission as employer. Government agencies
are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire employees to help do those tasks
as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will
contribute to an agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the
agency's effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her.
The reason [a] governor may . .. fire [a] deputy is not that this dismissal would somehow be
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. It is that the governor and the governor's
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In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court described the public
employee speech problem as involving "a balance between the interests
of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."
188
It is no accident that this reminds us of Marsh, in which the Court
understood itself as balancing the rights of the landowner against the
speech rights of Marsh. And it is also no accident that the Court has at
times recast, for the better, the nature of the balance as one more
resembling the concerns of the institutional theory-that between the
government's responsibilities as sovereign and those as employer.189
The employee speech cases establish that the Court has not applied a
simple, formal identification theory on this side of the Constitutional
Law axis either. Instead it has (1) identified a private action problem
with the application of ordinary public Constitutional Law to employee
speech cases, and (2) borrowed principles of private Constitutional Law
to correct the problem. This borrowing consists of allowing what
amounts to "for cause" termination when the public employee's speech
disrupts the efficiency of the government office. 190
There is much more to examine on this side of the lawmaking
Categorization Problem. Just as the various state action approaches I
examined and rejected above have valuable intuitions, 19 1 so too might
they provide intuitions for finding and repairing private action
problems.
For example, is there a "weakness theory" analogous to the intuition
animating the power theory? Where the government's coercive capacity
is weak, that is, where it is unusually similar to that of ordinary market
actors, the application of public Constitutional Law lacks its ordinary
justification. If the government is just another employer in a
competitive labor market, is buying and selling in the market like
ordinary market actors,' 9 3 has as its mission to serve an individual's
staff have a job to do, and the governor justifiably feels that a quieter subordinate would allow
them to do this job more effectively.").
188. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
189. See, e.g., Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (explaining that the fact that it is acting as an
employer permits a governmental entity to regulate in the name of efficiency).
190. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) ("While as a matter of good
judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their
employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for
employee complaints over internal office affairs.").
191. See supra Section III.A.
192. See Strauss, supra note 105, at 416 (arguing that when the government is subject to
ordinary market forces it should be subject to less stringent constitutional scrutiny).
193. The private action problem sheds light on the market-participant exception to the
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private purpose,194 or is otherwise -appropriately acting as a self-
interested entity,19 courts should and do import private secondary rules
to displace more searching public rules.
I do not attempt to give a full account of private action problems in
this Article. But these examples show how difficult cases, the odd
outcroppings, can be understood better with a full appreciation of law's
public-private bedrock.
CONCLUSION
The institutional perspective on state action provides a firm
theoretical foundation for the doctrine. It reveals that the state action
question is found in areas of law other than the body of recognized state
action cases. It explains the political and common law regulation of
private conduct with public-type norms. It explains the focus in state
action cases on discrete and insular minorities. It connects the rather
odd but important smattering of state action cases with the deeper
structure of legal systems. While it does not render every state action
question easy, it at least has the virtue of showing why they are hard.
State action, conversely, demonstrates the importance of
apprehending law's public-private structure. The structural theory, by
focusing on the fundamental division between collective and individual
action, helps reduce a great many seemingly unrelated substantive
questions to different aspects of the same underlying institutional
question. For this reason, the light it shines on state action can similarly
illuminate other areas of our law. Because the structural theory is
general, applicable to any collective, and because the institutional state
action theory is cast in terms of the structural theory, we now have the
Dormant Commerce Clause cases. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 685 (1999) ("[T]he prospect that States will use custom
duties, exclusionary trade regulations, and other exercises of governmental power. .. to favor
their own citizens .. . is entirely absent where the States are buying and selling in the market.");
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436, 446 (1980) (upholding South Dakota's decision to sell
the product of a state cement plant on a priority basis to South Dakota citizens and
distinguishing "between States as market participants and States as market regulators").
194. See, e.g., Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981) (holding that state-
employed public defender was not subject to constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the
defender serves "essentially a private function" of advancing his or her client's interests).
195. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 370 (1981) (refusing to apply the one person,
one vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to an Agricultural Improvement and
Power District). The Court in Ball decided, based on the limited powers and mandate of the
District, that the nonvoting members and the District--despite its formal, public status-had a
consumer-business relationship rather than a citizen-sovereign one. "The functions of the
[District] are therefore of the narrow, special sort which justifies a departure from the popular-
election requirement of the Reynolds case." Id
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tools to look for state action problems in other types of legal systems.
For example, in international law, is there a state action theory that
should be applicable to treaties, or other rules made by the private
entities (states, here) within the system that raise state action problems?
I have endeavored to use the tools of the structure theory to develop
a fuller picture of the state action problem. This is only a beginning,
both to filling in that picture and to developing the public-private theory
of legal systems.
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